

A Summary of the Durham Report
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1 Introduction

John H. Durham was appointed Special Counsel 19 Oct 2020 by then Attorney General William Barr to examine the performance of the intelligence investigations made by various federal agencies during the 2016 Presidential campaign. His final report [1] was provided to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland 12 May 2023. The report is unclassified but references a separate classified appendix, provided to the Attorney General separately. The Report is devoted to the results of his investigation as to how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) handled the investigation as to whether Republican candidate Donald Trump was colluding with the Russian government during the 2016 Presidential election as claimed by Democratic candidate Hilary Rodham Clinton, the mainstream media, social media, and other political commentators. Mr. Durham found that there was no "Trump-Russia collusion" (the same as a previous report issued by Robert Mueller [2]); and furthermore, the FBI was deficient in how it began and handled the investigation.

Mr. Durham's report is 306 pages long, and consists of several sections. The sections appear to have been written by separate committees, and the Report does not appear to have been subjected to general editing. There are some redundancies, and many dates are unclear or omitted. Throughout, identities are camouflaged using names such as "Handling Agent-1" or "Supervisory Agent-2", etc., which seems like a protection scheme. Some of the sections detail investigative procedures to be followed by the FBI; some contain background information on the various personnel involved; some contain detailed descriptions of events. Mr. Durham chose to "cut the deck" by category or person, and it is easy to get a good sense of how the FBI conducted the investigation for each of those. But it is difficult to get a sense of the unified chronology and overall effects as they occurred. This essay is an attempt to summarize Mr. Durham's Report to enhance understanding of the sequence of events and their implications based on the unclassified portion. In cases where the Report only indicates general dates, I have so indicated with a tilde (i.e., "~15 Aug" means "about 15 Aug").

References to Mueller's and Durham's reports will be cited as:

- a. [1, p. xxx] means Durham's report [1], p. xxx
- b. [2, p. xxx] means Mueller's report [2], p. xxx

The Report calls out the Steele Reports (a.k.a. the Steele dossier) per the FBI's internal numbering scheme, with the dates thereof scattered throughout the Report. The correlation of the FBI's internal numbering and dates for the six important Steele Reports is as follows:

- a. 2016/080: provided 5 Jul 2016, but dated 20 Jun 2016
- b. 2016/094: 19 Jul 2016

- c. 2016/095: not dated, but must be late Jul/early Aug 2016
- d. 2016/102: 22 Aug 2016
- e. 2016/111: 14 Sep 2016
- f. 2016/112: not stated by Durham, but must be between 14 Sep 2016 and 19 Sep 2016

Although made clear in only one place in the report [1, p. 104], Peter Strzok, Brian Auten, and Jonathan Moffa were the principal actors behind the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

2 Cast of Characters

Abbate, Paul, Assistant Director at the FBI Washington Field Office
Alfa Bank, a Russian bank, falsely alleged to have had a special connection to the Trump campaign
Anderson, Trisha, FBI Deputy General Counsel (handling counterintelligence and cyber)
Archey, David, Deputy Assistant Director, FBI
Assange, Julian, founder of WikiLeaks
Auten, Brian, Supervisory Analyst, FBI
Baker, James, General Counsel, FBI
Barr, William, U. S. Attorney General, 2017-2020
Berkowitz, Jake, employee at Fusion GPS
Belton, Catherine, journalist at the *Financial Times*
Biden, Joseph R., Vice President of the United States (now President)
Boone, Jennifer, Deputy Assistant Director, FBI (presumably in the Counterintelligence Division)
Brennan, John O., Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Burrows, Christopher, a co-principal at Steele's firm Orbis
Caldwell, Luke, Criminal Division Attorney General, Department of Justice
Campbell, Joe, Criminal Investigative Division Assistant Director, FBI
Central Dynamics (a.k.a. Cendyn), an email firm
Clinesmith, Kevin, FBI attorney; Assistant General Counsel in the National Security and Cyber Law Branch; assisted with preparing FISA applications
Cohen, David, CIA Deputy Director
Cohen, Michael, an attorney for Trump
Coleman, Randall (Randy); Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch Executive Assistant Director, FBI Headquarters
Conway, Kellyanne, campaign manager for the Trump campaign, succeeded Paul Manafort
Comey, James, Director, FBI
Corn, David, journalist at *Mother Jones*
Corsi, Dina, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, FBI
Danchenko, Igor, a Russian citizen residing in Washington, sub-source for Christopher Steele, suspected of being a Russian asset in 2011, became an FBI CHS under Crossfire Hurricane
Dearlove, Richard, former Director of British MI-6
Divyekin, Igor, a senior official in the Russian Presidential Administration
Dolan, Charles, public relations professional, formerly a prominent member of the DNC, conducted public relations with several Russian entities and Russian government officials (including Dimitry Peskov, Alex Pavlov, Sergei Kislyak, and Mikhail Kalugin); in 2016 was employed by the public relations firm kglobal
Downer, Alexander, Australian High Commissioner
Durham, John H., Special Counsel, author of the "Durham Report" [1]
Elias, Marc, General Counsel to the Clinton campaign
Evans, Stuart J., Deputy Attorney General
Feinstein, U. S. Senator from California

Flynn, Michael, General (ret.), National Security advisor to Donald Trump
Fritsch, Peter, a principal at Fusion GPS
Foer, Franklin, a reporter/correspondent at *Slate Magazine*
Fusion GPS, an investigative firm in the U. S., under contract to Perkins Coie to perform opposition research on behalf of the Clinton campaign
Galkina, Olga, friend of Danchenko, executive at a Cyprus-based computer firm called Servers.com; provided some information to Dolan that ended up in the Steele Dossier
Graham, Lindsey, U. S. Senator from South Carolina
Hamburger, Tom; reporter at the *Washington Post*
Harpster, Michael, Criminal Special Agent in Charge, FBI New York Field Office
Helson, Kevin; FBI Special Agent, handler for Danchenko as a CHS
Hosenball, Mark, journalist at *Reuters*
Hulser, Ray, Public Integrity Section Chief, Department of Justice
Joffe, Rodney, a technology executive, also an FBI CHS
Johnson, David J. (D. J.), Associate Executive Assistant Director, FBI headquarters
Kalugin, Mikhail, head of the Russian Embassy's Economic Section in the U. S., 2010-2016
kglobal, a public relations firm
Kislyak, Sergei Russian Ambassador to the U. S. 2008-2017
Kosachev, Konstantin, head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Russian Duma
Lichtblau, Eric, journalist at the *New York Times*
Listrak, an IT firm in Pennsylvania
Manafort, Paul, Trump campaign manager until 29 Aug 2016
Mandiant, a cyber security company
McCabe, Andrew, Deputy Director, FBI
Medvedev, Dimitry, former President of the Russian Federation
Millian, Sergei, a real-estate broker in New York; had worked on a few of Trump's minor real estate deals; President of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce in NY, supporter of Trump; falsely claimed by Danchenko to be the source of the Trump-Russia collusion conspiracy
Moffa, Jonathan, Chief of Counterintelligence Analysis Section, FBI
Mook, Robby, campaign manager for the Clinton campaign
Mosk, Matthew, a producer at *ABC News*
Mueller, Robert S. III; former FBI director, former Special Counsel, and author of the "Mueller Report [2]
Novosti, a.k.a. *RIA Novosti*, a Russian state-run media outlet
Nuland, Victoria, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; a close confidante to Clinton
Obama, Barack H., President of the United States
Ohr, Bruce, a former Department of Justice official
Ohr, Nellie, a Russian-language expert at Fusion GPS, wife of Bruce Ohr
Orbis Business Intelligence, a.k.a. Orbis, a service firm owned by Christopher Steele
Packet Forensics, a tech company owned by Rodney Joffe
Page, Carter, international energy consultant and foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign
Page, Lisa, attorney in FBI OCG and Special Assistant to Andrew McCabe, FBI
Palmieri, Jennifer, head of communications for the Clinton campaign
Papadopoulos, George, unpaid foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign
Pavlov, Press Secretary for the Russian Presidential Administration
Perkins Coie, an international law firm in the U. S., under contract to the Clinton campaign
Peskov, Dimitry, Russian Presidential Administration Spokesman
Podesta, John, Clinton campaign Chairman
Priestap, E. W. "Bill", Assistant Director for Counterintelligence at the FBI

Ratcliffe, John, Director of National Intelligence (Trump administration)
Rhee, Jeannie, a prosecutor on the Mueller team
Rogers, Michael, Director, National Security Agency
Rogin, Josh, reporter at the *Washington Post*
Rosneft, a Russian energy conglomerate
Ross, Brian, correspondent at *ABC News*
Schiff, Adam, Congressman from California
Schweizer, Peter, author of the book *Clinton Cash*
Servers.com, a Cyprus-based computer firm where Olga Galkina was an executive
Sechin, Igor, Chairman of Rosneft
Simpson, Glenn, a principal at Fusion GPS
Sporre, Eric, Deputy Assistant Director of the Cyber Division, FBI
Steele, Christopher, paid FBI CHS, also a former British intelligence official
Stone, Peter H., and employee at Fusion GPS
Strzok, Peter, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, FBI
Sullivan, Jake, Chief Policy Advisor to the Clinton campaign
Sussmann, Michael, attorney employed by the law firm Perkins Coie, representing both the Clinton campaign and Rodney Joffe
Veselnitskaya, Natalia, a lawyer who had once worked for the Russian government
Walsingham partners, the US-based division of Christopher Steele's UK-based Orbis
Winer, Jonathan, a State Department employee who was Christopher Steele's contact at the State Department
Wray, Christopher, FBI Director (succeeding James Comey)
Yotaphone, a Russian mobile telephone provider
Zlodorev, Dimitry, a reporter/correspondent for *RIA Novosti*

3 Acronyms

CHS Confidential Human Source
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DNC Democratic National Committee
FARA Foreign Agents Registration Act
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
FSB Federal Security Service in Russia; the successor to the KGB
NSA National Security Agency
NYFO New York Field Office (FBI)
OCG Office of General Counsel (FBI)
OI Office of Intelligence
OIG Office of Inspector General (FBI)
OGA Other Government Agency
SIM Sensitive Investigative Matter (FBI); refers to certain types of investigations, including those of political figures and organizations [1, p. 22]. Opening a SIM by the FBI Headquarters requires notification to the U. S. Attorney or other Department of Justice official; if it involves national security, the FBI must also notify an official of the national Security Division.
TOR The Onion Router, an open-source global anonymous communications platform,
VPN Virtual Private Network

YPO Young President's Organization (a Russian meeting for business executives to discuss business opportunities in Russia)

4 Chronology of Events

Sep 2007: Sergei Millian began work as a CHS for the FBI, advising the FBI on Belarus and Russia [1, p. 185].

late 2008: Igor Danchenko, then working at the Brookings Institute, tried to enlist other employees to sell classified information. This attempt was reported to the FBI, which led to an FBI counterintelligence investigation of Danchenko [1, pp. 14, 129, 130].

2009: The FBI opened a preliminary investigation into Danchenko; it was later turned into a full investigation based on the discovery that Danchenko was associated with Russian intelligence [1, pp. 14, 130, 131]. Ultimately the FBI discovered that Danchenko was "connected in some manner to Russian intelligence" and was "hiding in plain sight" in the U. S. [1, p. 132].

2010: Christopher Steele began providing information to the FBI regarding Russian oligarchs; he was introduced to his FBI handler by Bruce Ohr, a former Department of Justice official [1, p. 109].

Jul-Aug 2010: The FBI requested the use FISA authorities to investigate Danchenko [1, p. 14].

2011: Igor Danchenko began working for Steele's firm Orbis as a side project, along with his main occupation as an employee at a Virginia-based venture capital firm [1, p. 127].

Mar 2011: The FBI closed Millian as a CHS for Belarus and Russia [1, p. 185].

Mar 2011: The FBI incorrectly concluded that Danchenko had returned to Russia and closed its investigation [1, pp. 14, 131].

30 Oct 2013: The FBI formally opened Christopher Steele as a CHS [1, p. 109].

2014: Danchenko's employer, the Virginia venture capital firm, went bankrupt. This employer had been sponsoring Danchenko's visa. In order to remain in the U. S., Danchenko managed to obtain employment at a Virginia tech company working on behalf of Orbis; that company would sponsor a continuation of his visa, but would not pay his salary. Danchenko, the new tech company, and Steele worked out an agreement whereby Steele's company (Orbis) would pay Danchenko's salary although he was actually working at the tech company. Thus the tech company was a front that allowed Danchenko to continue working for Orbis while the tech company sponsored Danchenko's visa [1, p. 128]. [1, p. 128].

2015: Russian intelligence officials tried to recruit Carter Page to work for Russian intelligence, which failed. The FBI investigated the Russians, and one Russian, Evgeny Buryakov pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 months [1, p. 46].

Apr 2015: The Clinton campaign "engaged Perkins Coie and Elias to provide 'legal counseling and representation [of the Clinton campaign] in connection to its legal affairs, including the Federal Election Commission and other regulatory requirements and general organizational and compliance matters'" [1, p. 245].

Aug 2015 - Jul 2016: Peter Strzok and Lisa Page sent text messages indicating a strong prejudice against Trump [1, p. 47]. Many of these have been made public.

7 Oct 2015: The DNC and the Democratic Congressional campaign "engaged Perkins Coie to provide legal advice in connection with the 'Federal Election Commission and other regulatory requirements and general organizational and compliance matters'" [1, p. 245]

2016

- ~Jan 2016: The FBI Criminal Investigation Division opened an investigation into Paul Manafort based on allegations of money laundering and tax evasion (unrelated to the Trump campaign) [1, p. 64].
- 22 Jan 2016: The FBI New York Field Office opened an investigation into the Clinton Foundation based on reliable information that a foreign government "had made, or offered to make, contributions to the Foundation in exchange for favorable or preferential treatment from Clinton" [1, p. 78].
- 27 Jan 2016: The FBI Little Rock Field Office opened an investigation into the Clinton Foundation based on reliable information that a commercial company had offered to give a large donation to the Clinton Foundation in return for favorable policies should Clinton be elected president, and also that a foreign government "had made, or offered to make, contributions to the Foundation in exchange for favorable or preferential treatment from Clinton" [1, p. 78].
- 29 Jan 2016: The FBI Washington Field Office opened a preliminary investigation into the Clinton Foundation based on allegations contained in Peter Schweizer's book *Clinton Cash* [1, p. 78].
- 1 Feb 2016: The FBI held a meeting to discuss the Clinton Foundation investigations, attended by: a) FBI: Executive Assistant Director Randy Coleman, Criminal Investigative Division Assistant Director Joe Campbell, the acting OCG Section Chief; and b) Department of Justice: Criminal Division Attorney General Leslie Caldwell, and Public Integrity Section Chief Ray Hulser. Hulser declined to prosecute on behalf of the Public Integrity Section, downplaying the allegations in the New York case [1, pp. 78, 79].
- 22 Feb 2016: A meeting was held at FBI Headquarters to discuss the Clinton Foundation investigations; it was led by FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe and attended by Campbell, Coleman, Washington Field Office Assistant Director Paul Abbate, and many others. McCabe was angry about the investigation and initially ordered all of them to be closed; he then permitted them to remain open, but Campbell ordered the attendees to obtain permission from McCabe before any overt investigative steps could be taken on these cases [1, pp. 79, 80]. This stalled the cases until a later videoconference (cf. 1 Aug 2016) [1, p. 80].
- Spring 2016: Perkins Coie, working for the Clinton campaign, hired Fusion GPS to conduct "opposition research into Trump and his associates" [1, pp. 11, 12]. "As set forth in the letter memorializing that engagement, the purpose was for Fusion to support Perkin Coie's legal advice to clients on 'defamation, libel and similar laws in which accuracy is an essential legal element'. Elias later (cf. 18 May 2022) explained that Perkins Coie hired Fusion for research and investigative services to assist Elias and Perkins Coie in representing the Clinton campaign. As part of those services, Fusion provided research and other services that were used to, among other things, promote the Alfa Bank allegations to the media and the FBI" [1, p. 245].
- 8 Mar 2016: An employee at the Brookings Institute introduced Charles Dolan to Igor Danchenko as a business opportunity. Ultimately Dolan (working for kglobal) entered into a contract with Servers.com (Olga Galkina) because Servers.com was trying to enter the U. S. market [1, p. 140].
- ~22 Mar 2016: Trump named George Papadopoulos as a foreign policy advisor [1, p. 61]. Papadopoulos was an energy consultant in the eastern Mediterranean, and was currently an employee of the London Center of International Law Practice; he had an acquaintance who was a diplomat who in turn was an acquaintance of an Australian diplomat [1, p. 51].
- late Mar 2016: Carter Page was named as a foreign policy consultant to the Trump campaign [1, p. 46]. Page's business experience involved Russian energy; he was known to the FBI, and had been interviewed three times from 2009 to 2013.
- 1 Apr 2016: FBI Director Comey sent an email to Brian Auten, a Headquarters Supervisory Agent, and others in which he "requested relevant information pertaining to any Presidential candidate" [1, p. 47].

- 1 Apr 2016: Perkins Coie, acting as General Counsel for the Clinton campaign, entered into a preliminary agreement with Fusion GPS to conduct opposition research into Donald Trump and his associates [1, p. 98].
- ~ 3 Apr 2016: The New York FBI office opened a counterintelligence investigation into Carter Page, not to investigate Page, but to see if any Russians were contacting Page [1, pp. 46, 47]. The NYFO did not intend to seek FISA warrants against Page, and did not open the investigation as a SIM, although Page was a known campaign consultant [1, p. 47].
- 7 Apr 2016: Comey was briefed on the Page investigation in New York, and Comey described it as a "high priority" to Auten and others [1, p. 47].
- 7 Apr 2016: Auten and others prepared a counterintelligence report on Carter Page for Comey [1, p. 47].
- 11 Apr 2016: Fusion GPS was hired by law firm Perkins Coie (working for the Clinton campaign) to perform opposition research on Trump [1, pp. 90, 180, 263].
- 13 Apr 2016: *RIA Novosti* published an interview of Sergei Millian conducted by Dimitry Zlodorev; in the article, "Millian described his real estate connections to Trump and spoke positively about Trump's candidacy" [1, p. 180].
- 22 Apr 2016: Nellie Ohr, an employee of Fusion GPS, prepared a report for Fusion GPS that discussed Sergei Millian's ties to Donald Trump [1, 180].
- 29 Apr 2016: Danchenko began discussions with Dolan regarding a business deal between a company named kglobal and Orbis; Danchenko mentioned that he had forwarded Dolan's letter to Christopher Steele and his associate Christopher Burrows. Danchenko also sent Dolan an email describing work he was doing for Orbis, referring to an "Intelligence Briefing Note" [1. pp. 140, 151].
- 6 May 2016: Papadopoulos' diplomat friend introduced him to the friend's Australian diplomat (a planned meeting) [1, p. 51].
- 7 May 2016: Nellie Ohr wrote another report, discussing Millian and several other items. She ultimately prepared 12 reports concerning Millian [1, p. 181]. Her reports "included Millian's views on how a potential Trump presidency might affect US-Russia relations", and contained links to YouTube videos featuring Millian in 2012 [1, p. 181].
- 10 May 2016: Papadopoulos and the Australian diplomat met again in a public place, joined by Australian High Commissioner Alexander Downer [1, pp. 51, 52]. "Much of the conversation centered on the upcoming U. S. election."
- Mid-May 2016: Randy Coleman, under orders from FBI Director Comey, ordered New York Field Office Assistant Director Diego Rodriguez to "cease and desist" the investigation into the Clinton Foundation due to some "undisclosed counterintelligence concern" [1, p. 80].
- 16 May 2016: The Australian diplomats in London sent a cable to the Australian government documenting their conversations with Papadopoulos. Part of it is "Paragraph Five" [1, p. 52, 53]:
"Mr. Papadopoulos was, unsurprisingly, confident that Mr. Trump could win the election. He commented that the Clintons had "a lot of baggage" and suggested the Trump team had plenty of material to use in its campaign. He also suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs. Clinton (and President Obama). It was unclear whether he or the Russians were referring to material acquired publicly or through other means. It was also unclear how Mr. Trump's team reacted to the offer. We note the Trump team's reaction, could, in the end, have little bearing on what Russia decides to do, with or without Mr. Trump's cooperation."
- ~19 May 2016: Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS met with Christopher Steele in the United Kingdom and hired Steele and his company Orbis to investigate Trump's ties to Russia [1, pp. 12, 98, 180]. Steele was a confidential human source for the FBI. Between Jul and Dec 2016, Steele produced a series of

- reports (known as the Steele dossier) containing claims about connections between Trump and Russia, and that the secret connections were done through Paul Manafort and Carter Page [1, 98]. Steele called his reports "Company Intelligence Reports" and provided them to the FBI, the State Department, and several media outlets; together they became known as the "Steele dossier" [1, p. 98]. Apparently Fusion GPS tasked Steele to approach Millian [1, p. 181].
- 26 May 2016: Danchenko (working with Steele) contacted Zlodorev to obtain Millian's contact information [1, p. 181].
- 31 May 2016: Dolan attended a meeting at the Russian embassy and met with Peskov, Pavlov, and Dimitry Medvedev, in preparation for the Young President's Organization Conference [1, p. 142].
- 9 Jun 2016: Senior members of the Trump campaign met in Trump Tower with a Russian lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya; she had previously worked for the Russian government. This meeting was prompted by an email to Donald Trump Jr., which stated that the Crown prosecutor in Russia was willing to provide negative information about Clinton. The FBI did not learn of this meeting until sometime in Jun 2017 [1, p. 55].
- summer 2016: Joffe, Sussmann, others at Fusion GPS, several university cyber researchers, and employees at internet tech companies began compiling white papers and data. "Joffe tasked these researchers to mine internet data to establish a connection between Trump and Russia"; the goal was, in conjunction with Sussmann and Perkins Coie, to support a "narrative" that would tie Trump to Russia [1, p. 246].
- summer-fall 2016: Danchenko and Charles Dolan met at several business conferences in Moscow. One of these, held in the Ritz-Carlton, was allegedly the site of certain sexual allegations against Trump. Dolan provided the allegations against Trump to Danchenko, supposedly based on his contacts with the Ritz-Carlton staff, which Danchenko provided to Steele for inclusion in the dossier [1, p. 15].
- 27 Jun 2016: Peter Frisch of Fusion GPS sent an email to Franklin Foer of *Slate Magazine*, implying Millian was KGB (thus implicating Trump, as Millian was a Trump supporter) [1, p. 182].
- 1 Jul 2016: FBI Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent sent an email to Auten and others stating that the counterintelligence report on Page, and similar investigations into others, as "a top priority for Director Comey" [1, p. 47].
- 5 Jul 2016: Steele provided his first of a series of reports (2016/080) to his FBI handler regarding Trump, the accumulation of which became known as the "Steele dossier" or "Steele Reports" [1, p. 12]. The first one was dated 30 Jun 2016 and contained, among other things, "salacious information about Donald Trump's alleged sexual activities during trips to Moscow, and details of how the Kremlin reportedly had been 'feeding' information to Trump's campaign regarding his political rivals." This information came from Dolan to Danchenko, as Danchenko did not stay at the Ritz-Carlton [1, pp. 144-147]. Steele informed his FBI handler that he had been hired by Fusion GPS to obtain information about Trump; that Fusion GPS had been hired by a law firm; and that the ultimate client was "senior Democrats" supporting Clinton. Furthermore "HC" was aware of Steele's activities (the FBI handler interpreting "HC" as referring to Hillary Clinton) [1, p. 110]. Steele also stated that he had previously discussed the Trump data with Glenn Simpson, and they agreed it had national security implications that should be forwarded to the FBI [1, pp. 110, 111]. A second allegation in this Steele report was that a Pavlov described a Clinton dossier that was being controlled by Dimitry Peskov on orders from Vladimir Putin, and had not been made available to Trump. This also apparently came from Dolan, as there is no evidence that Danchenko met Pavlov [1, pp. 157]. The FBI handler assumed Steele's data was politically motivated, but at the same time, could not discount it because Steele had been a reliable CHS; the FBI did not attempt to verify any of it [1, pp. 111, 146-148].
- 13 Jul 2016: Jake Berkowitz of Fusion GPS sent Glenn Simpson a document discussing Millian; this indicates that Fusion GPS was researching Millian in parallel with Danchenko [1, pp. 181, 182].

- 13 Jul - 28 Jul 2016: Glenn Simpson was in contact with *ABC News* producer Matthew Mosk about Millian (attempting to link Trump to Millian to Russia) [1, p. 182].
- 15 Jul 2016: Dolan attended a meeting at the Russian embassy and met with Peskov, Pavlov, and Dimitry Medvedev, in preparation for the Young President's Organization Conference [1, p. 142].
- 19 Jul 2016: Steele issued a report (2016/094) to his FBI handler, claiming among other things, that Carter Page had met secretly with Igor Sechin and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official Igor Divyekin, supposedly about lifting sanctions and compromising information Russia had on both Clinton and Trump [1, pp. 92, 111, 196]. Peter Fritsch of Fusion GPS leaked this to the media (including the *Washington Post*, *The New Yorker*, *Quartz*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Reuters*, and *Slate*), and they proceeded to investigate [1, pp. 92-94].
- 21 Jul 2016: An FBI supervisor from a New England field office had been contacted previously by one of his former CHS's. On 21 Jul 2016 they met, and the former CHS told the FBI agent that "he/she had been contacted by a colleague who owns an investigative firm and who was looking into Trump's various business contacts and ventures in Russia". The former CHS told the FBI that the firm was working for the DNC and another unnamed person, and provided the FBI agent with a list of 45 people and entities that had come up in the firms' investigation [1, p. 64]. The FBI agent forwarded the list to his supervisor [1, p. 65], who forwarded it to FBI Headquarters (cf. 2 Aug 2016). The former CHS did not identify the firm or individual; they were Glenn Simpson and Fusion GPS [1, p. 65].
- 22 Jul 2016: WikiLeaks published a series of emails that had been hacked from DNC servers [1, p. 63].
- 22 Jul 2016: Peter Fritsch traded emails with Franklin Foer of *Slate Magazine*: a) Fritsch to Foer: "now we need to go to the next level, which is in the works"; b) Foer to Fritsch: "Good deal -- what's the next level?"; c) Fritsch to Foer: "it's who Carter Page met with in early July and what they talked about" [1, p. 92].
- 24 Jul 2016: Robby Mook gave several interviews in which he claimed that the Russians had hacked the DNC to help Trump, and that Trump made "troubling statements" about Russia [1, p. 89].
- 25 Jul 2016: Mark Hosenball of Reuters sent an email to Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS: "If you have stuff on the Carter Page guy, including his most recent excursion, please send. Doing two Russian hacking stories today and might be able to do another as early as tomorrow" [1, p. 92].
- 26 Jul 2016: "Australia provided the U. S. Embassy in London certain information its diplomats had memorialized at or around the time of the meetings with Papadopoulos" [1, p. 52].
- 26 Jul 2016: Peter Fritsch traded emails with Jay Solomon of the *Wall Street Journal*: a) Fritsch to Solomon: "OTR the easy scoop waiting for confirmation: that dude Carter Page met with Igor Sechin when he went to Moscow earlier this month. Sechin discussed energy deals and possible lifting of sanctions on himself et al. He also met with a senior Kremlin official called Divyekin who told Page that have good kompromat on Hillary and offered to help. He also warned Page they have good kompromat on the Donald. I know of one person who is chasing this and has asked Kremlin about these meets. The response: there was no meeting between Sechin and Page "at the Kremlin". Uh, well, OK ... maybe somewhere else? No comment. Needless to say, a senior Trump advisor meeting with a former KGB official close to Putin, who is on the Treasury sanctions list, days before the Republican Convention and a big Russian-backed Wiki Leak would be huge news"; b) Solomon to Fritsch: "Page is neither confirming nor denying"; c) Fritsch to Solomon: "Call Adam Schiff or *difi* [Senator Dianne Feinstein] for that matter. I bet they are concerned about what Page was doing other than giving a speech over 3 days in Moscow"; d) Fritsch to Solomon: "It's kind of hard to believe that the WSJ is ignoring the Russia stuff. Literally everyone is chasing this [expletive] now." [1, p. 93].
- 26 Jul 2016: Hilary Clinton approved "a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by the Russian security services"; known as the Clinton Plan intelligence" [1, p. 81].

- 27 Jul 2016 ff: Apparently Russian intelligence knew about the Clinton Plan, since U. S. intelligence "obtained insight into Russian intelligence" about the plan sometime in the next few days. It was not known if the allegation was accurate or to what extent if any the Russians were involved [1, pp. 81, 84]. The official who received it immediately made the CIA aware of it; John Brennan received a copy personally, but the date is uncertain (cf. 29 Jul 2016) [1, p. 84].
- 27 Jul 2016: The State Department in London passed the Australian information from 26 Jul 2016 to the FBI Legal Attaché in London [1, p. 52]; probably including "Paragraph Five". Apparently the Australians did not investigate any of the conversations with Papadopoulos; the Australians sent the information to the FBI Attaché due to the WikiLeaks email release 22 Jul 2016 [1, p. 54].
- 27 Jul 2016: Lisa Page traded texts with Peter Strzok: a), Page to Strzok: "Have we opened on him yet? Trump & Putin. Yes, it's a really a thing <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/trumpputin-yes-it-s-really-a-thing>"; b) Strzok to Page: "Opened on Trump? If Hillary did, you know 5 field offices would ..." [1, p. 49].
- 28 Jul 2016: Christopher Steele's FBI handler forwarded Steele's first two reports (cf. 5 Jul 2016 and 19 Jul 2016) to the FBI New York Field office [1, p. 111]. The New York Field Office forwarded them to SAC Michael Harpster 28 Jul 2016; Harpster later recalled that he immediately forwarded them to Randall Coleman and David Johnson at FBI headquarters, but there is no record of it. These, along with four subsequent ones, did not reach the Crossfire Hurricane investigators until 19 Sep 2016 [1, p. 111]. The Durham team was not able to determine the cause of the 75-day delay [1, pp. 112-116].
- 28 Jul 2016: Harpster happened to be at FBI headquarters for training; he met with Randall Coleman and David Johnson; Harpster believed that Coleman and Johnson were already aware of the Steele reports, and that Coleman had already discussed them with higher FBI officials [1, p. 114].
- 28 Jul 2016: Donald Trump held a news conference in which he made the comment, "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you are able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing" [1, pp. 55, 57]. Trump was referring to the emails that were deleted from Clinton's private server when she was Secretary of State [1, p. 55 and 2, p. 49]. Peter Strzok, in his book *Compromised: Counterintelligence and the Threat of Donald J. Trump*, claimed that the Australians turned over "Paragraph Five" because of this comment made by Trump. That is of course patently false, as the Australians had turned it over the day before Trump's news conference [1, pp. 55, 56].
- 28 Jul 2016: "Director Brennan met with President Obama and other White House personnel, during which Brennan and the President discussed intelligence relevant to the 2016 presidential election as well as the potential creation of an inter-agency Fusion cell to synthesize and analyze intelligence about Russian malign influence on the 2016 presidential election." [1, p. 84]
- 28 Jul 2016: The FBI received information from Australia (a cable dated 16 May 2016) concerning comments allegedly made by George Papadopoulos in a tavern on 6 May 2016 [1, pp. 8, 52].
- 28 Jul 2016: Glenn Simpson emailed Fusion GPS's reports on Millian to Matthew Mosk at *ABC News* [1, p. 183].
- 29 Jul 2016: *The Washington Post*, using its contacts in Moscow, debunked the claim (cf. 19 Jul 2016) that Carter Page had met with Russian officials in Moscow, per an email from Tom Hamburger at the *Post* to Glenn Simpson: "Re: FYI, we are getting kick back to the idea; That Page met with Sechin and Ivanov 'It's [expletive] impossible' said one of our Moscow sources" [1, p. 94].
- 29 Jul 2016: Director Brennan called James Comey and told him about his meeting with Obama the day before. Brennan's recollection (cf. 21 Aug 2020) is that he did not yet see the Clinton Plan intelligence [1, p. 84].
- 29 Jul 2016 ff: CIA Director Brennan, DNI James Clapper, FBI Director James Comey, and other agency officials "took steps to ensure that dissemination of intelligence related to Russia's election interference efforts, including the Clinton Plan intelligence, would be limited to protect sensitive infor-

- mation and prevent leaks". The Fusion Cell was set up after this meeting to analyze information on Russian activities; some CIA personnel believed the Clinton Plan was the reason the Fusion Cell was set up [1, p. 84].
- 29 Jul 2016: Michael Sussmann of Fusion GPS met with Marc Elias of Perkins Coie (general counsel to the Clinton campaign) at Perkins Coie's office; Sussmann's time was billed to the Clinton campaign [1, p. 95].
- 29 Jul 2016: Sergei Millian was interviewed by Brian Ross *ABC News*, but it was not aired until Jan 2017 (after the Steele reports became public) [1, p. 183].
- 31 Jul 2016: The FBI opened a full investigation called "Crossfire Hurricane" based on the Australian information without conducting any type of evaluation, and despite having no actual evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. The FBI also failed to conduct even a cursory examination of the information based on their standards and analysts [1, pp. 8, 9]. Peter Strzok "both wrote and approved the electronic communication opening the matter from the very start as a full investigation rather than an assessment or preliminary investigation", with the approval of Assistant Director Priestap, contrary to standard FBI protocol [1, pp. 23, 24, 47, 48, 61]. The claimed objective was "to determine whether individual(s) associated with the Trump campaign [were] witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia" [1, p. 51]; Strzok quoted "Paragraph Five (cf. 16 May 2016 and 27 Jul 2016) verbatim in the justification [1, p. 52]. The opening of a full investigation into members of the Trump campaign was not justified because no preliminary interviews or discussions had taken place with either the Australians or other U. S. intelligence agencies, and the FBI had no evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia [1, pp. 54-58]. Also, Strzok was unaware of the initial reports provided by Steele in early Jul 2016 to the FBI New York field office [1, p. 58]; Moffa and his staff of analysts on Russia were unaware of any collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia [1, p. 62].
- 31 Jul 2016: Russian intelligence already knew about Steele's election activities, and also had access to U. S. intelligence that would have permitted them to determine Steele's sub-sources. However, this was not known to the FBI until sometime in 2018 [1, pp. 107-109].
- 31 Jul 2016: "It appears that in Jul 2016 the FBI had not yet determined that the dual reporting it was receiving" (i.e., from the New England office and the Steele dossier) "was coming from the same source -- that is, Simpson and Fusion GPS" [1, p. 65]. "Further, it does not appear that the FBI was aware of the fact that essentially the same information the former CHS was providing to the New England supervisory agent was being provided to the media by Glenn Simpson and Fusion GPS. This was a pattern similar to that employed in the Alfa Bank matter when the Alfa Bank allegations were provided to members of the media by Fusion GPS and then to the FBI through Michael Sussmann" [1, p. 66].
- late Jul/early Aug 2016: "Sussmann, Joffe, and agents of the Clinton campaign assembled and disseminated the Alfa Bank allegations and other derogatory information about Trump and his associates to the media and then to the FBI." [1, p. 245]
- late Jul/early Aug 2016: Steele provided another Report to the FBI (2016/095, undated, cf. [1, pp. 12, 22]), claiming: "Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an ethnic Russian close associate of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, admitted that there was a well developed conspiracy of co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the Trump side by the Republican candidate's campaign manager, Paul Manafort, who was using foreign policy advisor Carter Page, and others, as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, whom President Putin apparently both hated and feared". Steele got this from Danchenko; Danchenko got it from an anonymous phone call supposedly in late Jul 2016 from a guy with a Russian accent that he claimed was Sergei Millian, although Danchenko and Millian had never met. Steele mistakenly believed that Danchenko

knew Millian, and Danchenko did not correct him [1, pp. 172, 173, 179]. Yet the FBI failed to investigate whether any of the Trump-Russia allegations were true, or if Danchenko's version of events made any sense, or why Millian would make claims against Trump; but used it to justify the first Page FISA warrant [1, pp. 172, 185]. Durham's investigation showed that Danchenko had fabricated the entire episode about the anonymous call and Trump-Russia collusion allegations [1, p. 176].

early Aug 2016: Joffe had meetings or conference calls with Sussmann and Elias regarding the plan to establish that a communication channel existed linking Trump to Russia [1, p. 246].

1 Aug 2016: The FBI held a videoconference regarding the three investigations into the Clinton Foundation (cf. 22 Jan 2016, 27 Jan 2016, 29 Jan 2016), and ordered: a) the Washington and Little Rock investigation to be closed and consolidated into the New York investigation; b) the New York investigation was authorized to seek subpoenas from the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York [1, p. 80]. However, both later declined to issue subpoenas [1, p. 80].

2 Aug 2016: Strzok, another FBI special agent from Washington, and the FBI's legal attaché in London met in London with the Australian diplomats to "assess and clarify" what Papadopoulos had said in the meetings. The Australian diplomat that wrote "Paragraph Five" told the FBI that it was written in a "purposely vague way"; because Papadopoulos left a number of things unexplained and "did not say he had direct contact with the Russians" [1, pp. 53, 54, 59, 64]. The Legal Attaché recognized immediately that there was nothing to the Papadopoulos conversations and privately believed that FBI's activities made no sense [1, pp. 60, 61].

2 Aug 2016: The information obtained from the New England CHS (cf. 21 Jul 2016) regarding the 45 names was received at FBI Headquarters and the Crossfire Hurricane investigators (Moffa, Auten, Strzok, and another special agent) [1, p. 65].

3 Aug 2016: Joffe tasked his employees at his tech company to "mine and assemble internet data" that would support a Trump-Russia internet connection "narrative" [1, p. 246].

3 Aug 2016: CIA Director John Brennan briefed President Obama and "other senior national security officials" including Vice President Joe Biden, Attorney General Loretta Lynch, and FBI Director Comey on the alleged plan to vilify Trump per the Clinton Plan intelligence [1, pp. 81, 85, 97].

10 Aug 2016: The FBI opened full investigations into George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, General Michael Flynn, and Paul Manafort based on two facts: a) all were associated with the Trump campaign; and b) all except Papadopoulos had business connections or a history of travel to Russia [1, p. 64]. This was done despite the FBI having no evidence of collusion, and the failure of the 2 Aug 2016 meeting to show any evidence from the Papadopoulos conversations with the Australians [1, pp. 63, 64, 295]. Peter Strzok himself, who both drafted and approved the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, admitted "there's nothing to this, but we have to run it to ground"; thus indicating it should have been treated as an assessment or at most a preliminary investigation [1, p. 294].

11 Aug 2016: The FBI Supervisory Special Agent and the FBI Liaison attorney in the UK agreed via Lync chat that the predication for opening a full investigation (Crossfire Hurricane) was "thin" [1, p. 294].

11 Aug 2016: The FBI met with one of its CHS, who had been a long-term FBI CHS; the CHS informed the FBI that they had decided not to join the Trump campaign, but were willing to not advise the campaign of this decision [1, p. 297]. "The Crossfire Hurricane investigators were pleased or relieved that the source did not want to join the campaign. But as to whether the FBI encouraged or directed the source to avoid notifying the campaign" is not clear [1, p. 297].

11 Aug 2016: "Sussmann and Elias began facilitating collaboration and information sharing by Joffe, Fusion GPS, and the Clinton campaign" using email [1, p. 248].

~ mid-Aug 2016: The NYFO's investigation of Page (and four sub-files) was transferred to FBI headquarters as part of Crossfire Hurricane [1, p. 47].

- ~ mid-Aug 2016: Sussmann met with Fusion GPS and Steele in Perkin Coie's offices to discuss both the Steele dossier and progress on the Alfa Bank operation. Steele and Sussmann have conflicting accounts of what happened at this meeting; Steele testified later in a British legal proceeding "that Fusion personnel tasked Steele to research and produce intelligence about Alfa Bank, which he did" [1, p. 249]. This research by Steele regarding the Alfa Bank appeared in his report 2016/112. (Although Durham's report does not mention it, 2016/112 had to have been issued between 14 and 19 Sep 2016) [1, p. 249].
- 17 Aug 2016: The "other government agency" (OGA) provided a memorandum advising the FBI Cross-fire Hurricane investigators that Carter Page had been approved as an "operational contact" for that OGA between 2008 and 2013, which included reporting that Page had made to the OGA regarding contacts with Russian intelligence officials [1, p. 186]. But the first three FISA applications did not mention that Page had helped the OGA in the past [1, p. 187].
- 19 Aug 2016: Paul Manafort resigned as Trump's campaign manager [1, p. 193].
- 20 Aug 2016: The FBI's CHS met with Carter Page, and the meeting was filmed and recorded. Page told the FBI CHS that he had never met Manafort, and although he had sent a few emails, never received a response [1, p. 193]. Thus the alleged link per the Steele Report between Page and Manafort acting as agents in a collusion scheme between the Trump campaign and Russia was refuted by Page, but the FBI never checked with Steele nor did they verify what Page told them [1, pp. 193, 194]. Three other items of importance were discussed: a) Page denied there was any "October surprise" coming from the Trump campaign, and when asked about the 33,000 emails, he denied knowing the Russians had them; b) his travel to Russia was for business, not for the Trump campaign; and c) Page was dismissive of Papadopoulos, and did not corroborate anything Papadopoulos had said to the Australians [1, pp. 194, 195]. When the FBI showed the tape to British intelligence in the fall of 2016, they recognized that Carter had said nothing of importance. But the FBI London Legal Attaché recognized that the FBI was proceeding anyway, and he "greased the skids" to accommodate it [1, pp. 60, 61].
- 20 Aug 2016: Rodney Joffe emailed two technology executives inquiring as to whether they knew of any connections between Millian and Trump; he included an "investigative" report from "Eyore" (never determined) which claimed that other than Manafort, Millian was the most likely intermediary between Trump and Russia. Joffe also included a specific reference to a website (Millian's Russian-American Chamber of Commerce website) called "Russianamericanchamber.com". This email was the result of a series of events: a) Fusion GPS' idea to link Trump with the Alfa Bank of Russia; b) Fusion GPS obtained the assistance of Michael Sussmann of Perkins Coie; and c) Sussmann enlisted Joffe to make the inquiry to other technology executives [1, p. 183, 184, 246].
- 21 Aug 2016: Several emails were sent between Joffe and university cyber researchers and tech company executives regarding the plan to show a link between Trump and Russia [1, pp. 246, 247].
- 22 Aug 2016: Joffe explained by email to tech company executives and university researchers that the plan to mine the internet data to find a connection between Trump and Russia was being done to "please certain 'VIPs', apparently referring to Sussmann, Elias, and the Clinton campaign." [1, p. 246]. Joffe also instructed an executive in a tech company that Joffe partly owned and in conjunction with Packet Forensics, another internet company, to perform research on the "online activities of Trump and his associates"; he also told this executive that he (Joffe) was working with a firm in Washington DC with close ties to the Clinton campaign and the Democratic Party. Joffe provided the tech company executive with a document (called the Trump Associates List) "containing physical addresses, email addresses, internet protocol (IP) addresses, email domains, and other personal information associated with various Trump associates, including information about some spouses and family members" [1, pp. 246, 247]. Although at least one of the executives did not like this task, they went along with it since Joffe was an important person in their business; the operation was code-named "Crimson Rhino" [1, p. 247].

The plan was: to examine DNS internet traffic between: 1) Spectrum Health of Michigan; 2) Trump Tower, 3) Trump Central Park West Tower, and 4) (after Trump became President) the Executive Office of the President. They were to analyze TOR traffic and claim that here was some hidden connection between Trump and the Alfa Bank routed secretly through Spectrum Health of Michigan. Several of the tech companies' employees and university researchers doubted any Trump-Alfa Bank connections could be established, other than faking one by using false emails. They admitted to each other that this was a very difficult and tenuous operation that would not withstand any type of scrutiny, but were unified in providing a source for a narrative because they did not like Trump [1, pp. 250-254].

- 22 Aug 2016: This is the latest date in which other members of the FBI (other than Comey, who had attended the 3 Aug 2016 meeting at the White House) learned of the Clinton Plan intelligence (cf. 26 Jul 2016); at minimum Brian Auten and Jonathan Moffa of the Crossfire Hurricane team were provided via email a summary of the Clinton Plan [1, p. 85].
- 22 Aug 2016: Christopher Steele issued another report (2016/102), claiming that Paul Manafort resigned from the Trump campaign because Corey Lewandowski hated him, to remove him from policy-making, and also due to some real-estate payments in Ukraine (implying they were political donations). Danchenko got this from Dolan; Dolan fabricated the claim that he had heard this from a Trump associate [1, pp. 150-152]
- 23 Aug 2016: The former CHS again contacted the FBI supervisor in New England; informing the FBI agent that he/she had reviewed a large amount of data from the investigative firm [1, p. 75]; the New England agent passed the update to FBI headquarters and Crossfire Hurricane investigators on the same day. The New England FBI still did not know the source was Glenn Simpson and Fusion GPS.
- 24 Aug 2016: Bruce Ohr had a phone call with Steele's FBI handler and asked if the FBI was going to do anything with the Steele reports. Ohr was told that a "group at FBI headquarters was working on them" [1, pp. 115, 116].
- ~late Aug 2016: The tech company and Packet Forensics (cf. 22 Aug 2016) provided an preliminary report to Joffe; it stated that the "researchers observed no connection that clearly indicated direct communications between said individuals and Russia that would imply money transfers from Russia to the United States within the last 90 days" [1, p. 247]. The "said individuals" are per the "Trump Associates List" provided 22 Aug 2016 [1, p. 247].
- 30 Aug 2016: Joffe began communicating directly with people employed at Fusion GPS. In the next few months, Fusion GPS employees communicated regularly with the media and urged them to publish articles claiming that Trump had connections to the Russian Alfa Bank [1, p. 249].
- Sep 2016: The FBI CHS (the same who had interviewed Page (cf. 20 Aug 2016)) and the Trump foreign policy advisor met with George Papadopoulos sometime in Sep 2016; the bait was to arrange for Papadopoulos to write papers on oil and gas, which were his specialty. Also, two undercover FBI employees met with Papadopoulos three times in Sep 2016 (cf. 14 Sep 2016, 15 Sep 2016), and two of those meeting were recorded. One of the undercover agents reported that Papadopoulos had said nothing of interest [1, pp. 215, 216].
- 1 Sep 2016: Sussmann met with Eric Lichtblau of the *New York Times*, probably to discuss the Trump-Alfa Bank allegations; he billed his time to the Clinton campaign [1, pp. 265, 266].
- 1 Sep 2016: An FBI CHS (the same one who interviewed Page (cf. 20 Aug 2016) interviewed a high-level foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign (but who was not the target of an FBI investigation). This is the same CHS that decided not to join Trump's campaign [1, p. 297]. This meeting had been encouraged by Page in the 20 Aug 2016 interview. The FBI CHS's goal was to determine if the foreign policy advisor had any knowledge about the WikiLeaks release of DNC emails. The Trump advisor did not mention WikiLeaks, but did mention that the campaign intended to use the upcoming public release of Clinton's emails. Despite there being no mention of WikiLeaks, the claim that the

- Russians had facilitated the release of the DNC emails to assist the Trump campaign appeared in all four FISA applications [1, pp. 212-215, 297].
- 2 Sep 2016: The CIA briefed Brian Auten, Jonathan Moffa, and possibly the FBI OGC Unit Chief-1 about the Clinton Plan to vilify Trump [1, pp. 10]. It is not certain if any members of the Crossfire Hurricane investigators were present; the briefing was led by the "official responsible for overseeing the Fusion Cell"; the official informed the FBI that the CIA intended to send the FBI a written investigative referral [1, 85]. It is certain that Bill Preistap, Jonathan Moffa, DAD Dina Corsi, and Acting AD for Cyber Eric Sporre learned of the Clinton Plan on this day [1, p. 86].
- 7 Sep 2016: The CIA sent a memo to James Comey and Peter Strzok advising them of the Clinton campaign's plan to "vilify Trump by tying him to Vladimir Putin so as to divert attention from her own concerns relating to her use of a private email server" [1, pp. 10, 86]. This is known as the *Referral Memo*. It reads in part:
- "Per FBI verbal request, the CIA provides the below examples of information the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE fusion cell has gleaned to date:
An exchange ... discussing US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's approval of a plan concerning US presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering US elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private email server. According to open sources, Guccifer 2.0 is an individual or group of hackers whom US officials believe is tied to Russian intelligence services. Also, per open sources, Guccifer 2.0 claimed credit for hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) this year" [1, p. 86]
- 6 Sep 2016: By this time, Sussmann, Joffe, and possibly others completed the first of three white papers on the alleged Trump-Alfa Bank connection [1, p. 257]. This first white paper stated, in part [1, pp. 257, 258]:
- "The Trump Organization is using a very unusually-configured 'secret' email server in Pennsylvania for current and ongoing email communications with Alfa bank (Moscow), and with Alfa Bank (Moscow) through another unusually-configured server (a 'TOR exit node') at Spectrum health in Michigan.
These servers are configured for direct communications between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank to the exclusion of all other systems.
The only plausible explanation for this server configuration is that it shows the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank to be using multiple sophisticated layers of protection in order to obfuscate their considerable recent email traffic."
Also, the white paper stated that the "secret" email server domain was "mail1.trump.email.com" hosted by Listrak, an email marketing company in Pennsylvania.
- ~ 6 Sep 2016: Sussmann provided the allegations about the Trump-Alfa Bank connection to Eric Lichtblau of the *New York Times* [1, p. 250].
- 12 Sep 2016: Sussmann and Elias traded emails regarding the Sussmann's efforts to promote the Trump-Alfa Bank allegations to the *New York Times* [1, p. 266].
- 13 Sep 2016: Matthew Mosk of *ABC News* emailed Berkowitz and Simpson at Fusion GPS, and asked, "What's the most official thing we have showing Millian tied to Trump? That would make it hard for the Trump org. to disavow Millian?" Berkowitz sent Mosk a screenshot of Millian's Trump Gold Donor Card that Millian had posted on his Instagram page [1, p. 183].
- 14 Sep 2016: Joffe, aware that his university researchers and tech company employees were not able to establish any connection between Trump and Alfa Bank that would withstand scrutiny, sent them an email containing the white paper, and asked them to evaluate it as if they were not experts and see if it would seem plausible to a non-expert [1, p. 253]. Two of the university researcher replied to a tech company executive endorsing Joffe's approach. However, one of the university researchers "maintained that the Alfa Bank data did not support and definitive conclusions" [1, p. 253].

- 14 Sep 2016: Steele issued another report (2016/111), claiming that Russian diplomat Kalugin had been recalled to Moscow because "Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US presidential election operation" would be exposed. But this information came from Dolan, not Danchenko, and was based on an article in BBC News; in fact, Kalugin was returning to Moscow as part of a normal rotation [1, pp. 154-156, 233]. Thus Steele claimed that Russian involvement in the election was true because of a BBC article that Dolan had found [1, 156]. In fact, Danchenko did not know about the allegations concerning Kalugin until Kalugin was helping him with his Russian passport [1, p. 233].
- 14 Sep 2016: Papadopoulos met with the second undercover FBI agent, who was posing as an assistant to the FBI CHS (same as cf. 20 Aug 2016, 1 Sep 2016). This conversation was recorded. Papadopoulos mentioned that he was unable to do business in Russia because his association with the Trump campaign. Papadopoulos also stated that he had never been to Russia [1, pp. 215, 216].
- 14 Sep 2016: By this time, the second and third white papers alleging a Trump connection to Alfa Bank had been completed; the second one was written by a university researcher; the third one was written by Fusion GPS [1, p. 257].
- 15 Sep 2016: Sussmann sent an email update on the progress of the Trump-Alfa bank allegations and the upcoming *New York Times* article to Clinton campaign officials Jake Sullivan, Robby Mook, John Podesta, and Jennifer Palmieri; Sussmann billed his time to the Clinton campaign [1, p. 266].
- 15 Sep 2016: Hilary Clinton tweeted: "Computer scientists have apparently uncovered a covert server linking the trump organization to a Russian-based bank"; and included statements by Jake Sullivan, referring to news media reports, that the allegations: a) "could be the most direct link yet between Donald Trump and Moscow "; b) "this secret hotline may be the key to unlocking the mystery of Trump's ties to Russia"; and c) "we can only assume that federal authorities will now explore this direct connection between Trump and Russia as part of their existing probe into Russia's meddling in our elections" [1, p. 266].
- 15 Sep 2016: One of the tech company executives responded to Joffe's 14 Sep 2016 email, stating that the white paper's conclusion was "plausible" in the narrow sense: "if the white paper intends to say that there are communications between at least Alfa Bank and Trump, which are being intentionally hidden by Alfa Bank, and Trump, I absolutely believe that is the case" [1, p. 253]. (But there was no evidence.) Another researcher replied to Joffe stating he believed that "there was 'a threshold of probable cause' for criminal and other federal violations" [1, pp. 253, 254].
- 15 Sep 2016: Papadopoulos met twice with the FBI CHS (cf. 20 Aug 2016, 1 Sep 2016, 14 Sep 2016), and it was recorded. The CHS proposed \$3,000 for Papadopoulos to write a paper on energy in Russia, Syria, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. The CHS also advised Papadopoulos that he had already met with the senior Trump foreign policy advisor (cf. 1 Sep 2016). They discussed the Clinton Foundation and Clinton giving access to the U. S. State Department in return for donations; Papadopoulos mentioned he turned down an invitation to speak in Russia due to his association with the Trump campaign; Papadopoulos also stated that Carter Page had either never met Trump and was (possibly) advising him on Russia only indirectly through others. Papadopoulos denied any connection between the Trump campaign and WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and Russia, noting that any of them would be illegal; but none of those facts were included in the subsequent FISA applications [1, pp. 216-219]. The FBI discounted Papadopoulos' statements regarding what was said initially to the Australian diplomats (cf. 28 Jul 2016), claiming in the FISA application the opposite of what Papadopoulos actually said [1, p. 221]. FBI official briefed on the conversation (including Andrew McCabe, Bill Priestap, James Baker, Jonathan Moffa, and Lisa Page) agreed that Papadopoulos' statements seemed rehearsed and therefore not exculpatory [1, p. 221]. The FBI failed to interview Papadopoulos to resolve any ambiguity between these two conversations and his comments to the Australians (cf. 7 May 2016, 10 May 2016, 16 May 2016, 26-28 Jul 2016) [1, pp. 220-222].

- 16 Sep 2016: One of the university researchers responded to Joffe's 14 Sep 2016 email, stating that "TOR exit nodes, by definition route traffic for all users, since they do not know the origin of the traffic. To say that the TOR exit is exclusively used by Alfa Bank goes too far." [1, p. 253]
- 16 Sep 2016: One of the tech company's executives emailed the other researchers discussing the Joffe/Sussmann white paper about the Alfa Bank-Trump connection. One of the allegations in the white paper was that "there was a TOR node at Spectrum Health that Alfa Bank had used to communicate with the Trump organization". This tech company executive stated that she had no reason to think that Alfa Bank had a VPN somehow through email.trump-email.com [1, p. 254]. However, she firmly believed that there were communications between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank and that she:
- "did not care in the least whether I'm right or wrong about VPN from Alfa Bank, [TOR] from Alfa Bank, or just SMTP artifact pointing to a 3-way connection. Rodney [Joffe] has carefully crafted a message that could work to accomplish the goals. Weakening that message in any way would in my opinion be a mistake." [1, p. 254]
- The FBI analysis later concluded that any arrangement as claimed in the white paper was false: a) "no instances of IP addresses in the range of 167.73.x.x (assigned to Spectrum Health) were ever indexed as TOR exit nodes"; b) "construction of TOR nodes makes the described arrangement impossible"; c) if it were true or possible, "using the TOR network the alleged manner would result in worse anonymization and security than simply using TOR in its default configuration"; and d) because of the random nature of TOR routing, there is no way to correlate any connection between Spectrum Health and Alfa Bank [1, p. 254].
- 19 Sep 2016: Perkins Coie lawyer Michael Sussmann met with FBI General Counsel James Baker at FBI Headquarters. Although he claimed to be providing information about Trump out of patriotic duty, he was in fact working for the Clinton campaign and two clients (Rodney Joffe and another tech company executive). Sussmann told Baker (and provided thumb drives and the three "white papers" assembled by Sussmann and Joffe) that claimed there was a secret communications channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank of Moscow; this connection had been fabricated by Joffe using internet data from the Trump Organization (cf. 6 Sep 2016, 27 Sep 2016) [1, pp. 16, 17, 95, 244, 245, 250, 255, 258]. Sussmann also told Baker that major news organizations were already aware of the allegations and intended to publish stories soon. "Baker considered Sussmann a friend and colleague", and Baker regarded this as a serious matter since the covert channel would disappear if it became public [1, p. 255].
- 19 Sep 2016: After meeting with Sussmann, Baker advised Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Bill Priestap and Deputy General Counsel Anderson about his conversation with Sussmann regarding the allegations of a secret connection between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank of Russia, including the fact that Sussmann had told him he was not working for any client [1, p. 265, 266]. Baker also later recalled that he briefed McCabe and Comey about the allegations [1, p. 266]. Baker gave the thumb drives and white paper either to Priestap or Strzok; records indicate it was Strzok, who gave the materials to Eric Sporre, Deputy Assistant Director of the Cyber Division, and he provided them to an FBI cyber expert [1, p. 267].
- 19 Sep 2016: FBI headquarters and the Crossfire Hurricane investigators received the first six reports made by Steele to his FBI handler (cf. 5 Jul 2016) [1, 66]. They were sent to FBI Headquarters by Steele's FBI handler [1, p. 117]. The reason for the time delay is unknown and Durham was unable to find out [1, pp. 12, 234]. The FBI did not have sufficient records to indicate who had been in contact with Steele prior to this receipt [1, p. 234]. By this time, Crossfire Hurricane had been in operation for about 6 weeks, but "had not resulted in the collection of any inculpatory information" [1, p. 66]. The FBI thus far had not interviewed Papadopoulos or Page (who offered to be interviewed), nor had used means to check phone records. The reason was that the FBI wanted to conduct Crossfire Hurricane covertly [1, pp. 66, 67].

- 20 Sep 2016: The FBI analysts at the Cyber Division completed their report on the white paper provided by Sussmann to Baker (cf. 19 Sep 2016). They concluded: a) the research in the white paper used questionable methodology and the conclusions were not supported by the data; b) it is illogical for a presidential candidate to name a secret server using his own name and register it to his own organization; and then "secretly" c) communicate with a Russian bank using the bank's IP address instead of a proxy server or TOR [1, p. 258].
- 21 Sep 2016: Despite the conclusion of the FBI Cyber division (cf. 20 Sep 2016), the FBI leadership decided to open a full investigation out of the Chicago Field Office "into the network communications between a US-based server and the Russian Alfa Bank organization". This was contrary to the normal FBI procedures for opening an investigation [1, p. 24]. The Crossfire Hurricane supervisor told one of the Chicago agents that "people on the 7th floor to include the Director are fired up about this server". Also, "Priestap says it's not an option - we must do it". The FBI Chicago agent "noted that the team was leaning towards this being a false server not attributed to the Trump organization", but they would "run it down" [1, pp. 258, 259]. The document opening the investigation included a claim that "the Department of Justice provided the FBI with a white paper that was produced by an anonymous third party", which is incorrect; the Chicago investigators later recalled that the understood allegations were given to FBI General Counsel by an anonymous source, thus the FBI Headquarters covered up Sussmann as the source [1, p. 259, 260]. The FBI Headquarters Program manager for the Alfa Bank case team recalled later that FBI leadership, including Strzok, instructed him not to identify the source to the team [1, p. 260]. The Alfa Bank case team never did learn that Sussmann was the source, despite several requests to FBI headquarters in late Sep 2016 to interview the source [1, p. 260].
- 21 Sep 2016: The FBI drafted an initial FISA application on Carter Page, using in part the Steele Reports received only two days earlier, without investigating anything in the Steele reports [1, pp. 73, 117, 124, 236, 292]. This was inconsistent with how a similar matter had been handled in 2015, when the FBI received information about a potential illegal foreign campaign contribution to Clinton, for which the FBI gave Clinton a defensive briefing [1, pp. 69-74]. Andrew McCabe later stated that the FISA warrant lacked probable cause without the Steele data [1, p. 117]; the FBI later stated that including the Steele data "allowed the FBI to clear the probable cause hurdle in the Page FISA application" [1, pp. 124, 125].
- 22 Sep 2016: Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS sent an email to Catherine Belton of the *Financial Times* regarding connections between Millian and Trump [1, p. 183].
- 22 Sep 2016: Sussmann emailed Rodney Joffe the IP information for Millian's Chamber of Commerce website [1, p. 184]. The rest of the email is unknown due to attorney-client privilege between Perkins Coie and the Clinton campaign [1, p. 184].
- 23 Sep 2016: Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS sent another email to Catherine Belton of the *Financial Times* regarding connections between Millian and Trump [1, p. 183].
- 23 Sep 2016: The former CHS again contacted the New England FBI supervisory agent (cf. 23 Aug 2016), informing him of additional information on Trump's ties to Russia, which the New England supervisory agent passed on to FBI Headquarters and the Crossfire Hurricane investigators [1, p. 65].
- 23 Sep 2016: Michael Isikoff published an article in *Yahoo News*, describing the contents of the Steele dossier [1, p. 65], containing much of the information in Steele Report 2016/094 (cf. 19 Jul 2016) [1, p. 234]. Isikoff attributed the source as a "senior U. S. law enforcement official" [1, p. 67]. Thus the investigation became public [1, p. 67]. Isikoff's article contained Page's alleged meetings with Sechin and Divyekin, and referenced a "well-placed Western intelligence source"; who two Crossfire Hurricane investigators believed to be Steele [1, p. 118]. Specifically, Isikoff's article claimed: a) Page was the subject of an investigation based on alleged private communications with Russian offi-

- cials; b) that Page's discussions with senior Russian officials close to Putin were being actively monitored and investigated; and c) that Page had met with Sechin and Divyekin [1, p. 196].
- 23 Sep 2016: Peter Strzok sent a Lync message to Brain Auten: "Looking at the *Yahoo* article (i.e. Isikoff). I can definitely say at a minimum [Steele's] reports should be viewed as intended to influence as well as to inform." [1, p. 87]
- 25 Sep 2016: Carter Page sent a letter to FBI Director James Comey; he requested that the FBI stop investigating his travel to Russia, and that he had previously been a source for the FBI and CIA, that he had already been interviewed (cf. 20 Aug 2016) and offered to be interviewed further [1, pp. 187, 195, 196]. The FBI did not respond to Page's offer until Mar 2017 [1, p. 197].
- 26 Sep 2016: Joffe emailed Simpson an email with the subject "as requested". The contents are unknown use to attorney-client privilege between Perkins Coie and the Clinton campaign [1, p. 184].
- 27 Sep 2016: Two FBI employees, working on the FISA application for Carter Page based on the Steele dossier, traded Lync messages questioning the merits of the Steele dossier as a suitable probable cause [1, pp. 100-102]. But the FISA application (issued by the Department of Justice) was pushed through under pressure from James Comey and Andrew McCabe [1, p. 102].
- 27 Sep 2016: Fritch and Simpson emailed Eric Lichtblau of the *New York Times* the IP look-up information of Millian's Russia-American Chamber of Commerce website. Fritsch pointed out that "Alfa" was the website service provider for Millian's website, implying that Millian and Trump had a connection to Alfa Bank. But, the website provider is actually Alfa telecom, a Lebanese telecom company, with no connections to Alfa Bank [1, p. 184].
- 27 Sep 2016: Eric Lichtblau of the *New York Times* emailed Fritsch and Simpson of Fusion GPS regarding connections between Millian and Trump [1, p. 183].
- late Sep 2016: "... high-ranking U. S. national security officials, including Comey and Clapper, received an intelligence product on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election that included the Clinton Plan intelligence. The Office [i.e., Durham] did not identify any actions that the CIA or FBI took in response to this intelligence product as it related to the Clinton Plan intelligence. ... No FBI personnel who were interviewed by the Office recalled Crossfire Hurricane personnel taking any action to vet the Clinton Plan intelligence. ... This stands in sharp contrast to its substantial reliance on the uncorroborated Steele Reports, which at least some FBI personnel appeared to know was likely being funded or promoted by the Clinton campaign." [1, pp. 86, 87]
- 2 Oct 2016: FBI personnel (including Auten and Clinesmith) did a review of the initial Carter Page FISA application; a footnote indicated that the source for Isikoff's article (cf. 23 Sep 2016) was Christopher Steele [1, p. 119].
- 2 Oct 2016: An agent with the National Computer Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) received two IP addresses from an anonymous source; the source stated the information was related to a *New York Times* story, and asked that the IP addresses be forwarded to the FBI. The NCFTA agent contacted the Chicago FBI and provided the IP addresses; the FBI was apparently already aware of these. The FBI performed an open source check on the two IP addresses; one was associated with Alfa Bank and the other with a home address in Moscow. The Durham team learned during the investigation that the "anonymous source" who contacted the NCFTA agent was actually Rodney Joffe [1, p. 262]. Joffe was at this time an FBI CHS, and provided the IP addresses anonymously to the NCFTA agent instead of his FBI handler to give the appearance of corroboration of the false allegations in the white paper (cf. 19 Sep 2016) [1, p. 261].
- 3 Oct 2016: The FBI cyber team in Chicago, conducting the full investigation (cf. 21 Sep 2016) of the Trump-Alfa Bank allegations per Joffe's white paper (cf. 19 Sep 2016), issued their report on the allegations. They found that the mail1.trump-email.com domain was registered to a company called Central Dynamics (a.k.a. Cendyn) and the server was located at a company called Listrak in Pennsylvania. Central Dynamics and Listrak provided data and log files, which were analyzed by the FBI

Chicago office; and the data showed no evidence to support the white paper allegations [1, p. 261]. The FBI also contacted Mandiant, a cybersecurity firm that was hired by Alfa Bank to conduct an internal investigation; Mandiant provided the FBI with its results, showing no evidence to support the Trump-Alfa Bank connections per the white paper [1, pp. 261, 262]. The FBI Chicago office stated in its report [1, p. 261]:

"FBI Chicago assesses Alfa Bank and Trump Organization related servers almost certainly did not communicate intentionally or covertly, based on the results of an internal examination of Alfa Bank servers by [redacted] and subsequent preventative steps employed by the companies. FBI Chicago has high confidence in this assessment, which is based on highly reliable sensitive sources with excellent access and corroborates FBI investigative activity conducted to date".

It turned out that the servers at Listrak supporting the Trump organization are configured only for outgoing email, and that "no one in the Trump organization had direct technical or system administrator access" to the servers, and that none of its servers were dedicated to the Trump organization. Thus the notion of a "Trump server" is inaccurate since none of them were controlled by the Trump organization [1, pp. 283-285].

- ~ 4 Oct 2016: FBI personnel investigating the Alfa Bank allegation received information from another CHS; the FBI handler told a FBI Chicago agent that the CHS had access to the white paper, had made an initial assessment of it, and thought the Trump-Alfa Bank connection "was credible but that the data appeared incomplete"; and secondly, that the CHS had been contacted by one of the university researchers who had authored one of the white papers (cf. 14 Sep 2016) [1, p. 263].
- 4 Oct 2016: FBI personnel, including Auten, met with Steele in Rome, and offered \$1,000,000 to Christopher Steele if he could produce any corroboration for the allegations in the "Steele dossier" [1, p. 118]. Steele never did provide any substantiation for any of the allegations [1, pp. 11, 124, 126, 137]. The FBI told Steele to restrict his reporting strictly to the FBI because by this time, the FBI was aware that Steele was also providing his reports to U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland via his contact at the State Department, Jonathan Winer [1, p. 118]. Nuland was a close associate of Clinton [1, p. 118]. The FBI agents did not discuss Isikoff's article with Steele, but there is some confusion here as some FBI people recall mentioning it to Steele [1, pp. 118-120, 234]. Steele told the FBI that Dolan might have information about Trump, but the FBI never interviewed Dolan [1, pp. 15, 138, 160, 163]. Steele also told the FBI that Russian Presidential Administration Spokesman Dmitry Peskov was heavily involved in the Russia/Trump operation [1, p. 119]. Steele told the FBI that his sub-source traveled frequently to Russia, was well-connected, and ran a network of sources there, but refused to name his primary sub-source [1, p. 126].
- 11 Oct 2016: Peter Strzok sent a Lync message to Kevin Clinesmith, telling him that Steele's unnamed client was presumed to be connected to the Clinton campaign [1, p. 87]. Those who knew the story about the Clinton Plan and the Referral Memo did not disclose either of those facts to either the Crossfire Hurricane investigators or to FBI General Counsel James Baker [1, p. 88].
- 11 Oct 2016: Deputy Attorney General Evans had a phone call with Peter Strzok and expressed his concerns about the FISA application against Page. Evans' main concern was that Steele, upon whose reports justified the application, may have been hired by the Clinton campaign [1, p. 102].
- 11 Oct 2016: Steele provided "the substance of the Alfa Bank allegations" to Jonathan Winer at the State Department, and Fusion GPS provided the same to Bruce Ohr at the State Department [1, p. 250].
- 12 Oct 2016: A meeting was held at the FBI, including Priestap, Strzok, Lisa Page, and others to address Deputy Attorney General Evans' doubts about the FISA application. But when Evans' concerns were pointed out to Comey, Comey decided to go ahead with the application anyway based on the Steele Reports, despite the fact that no one at FBI headquarters had contacted the FBI field office in New York, where the investigation began (cf. 3 Apr 2016) [1, pp. 102, 103].

- 13 Oct 2016: Two Crossfire Hurricane investigators had a Lync conversation, complaining about management prohibiting them from interviewing Carter Page (cf. 25 Sep 2016).
- 14 Oct 2016: The FBI circulated an amended Carter Page FISA application with a new footnote stating that the source for Isikoff's article (cf. 23 Sep 2016) was either Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS or the law firm he was working for (i.e., Perkins Coie) based on information they obtained from Steele. This assessment is based on the similarity between Isikoff's information and that contained in the Steele dossier [1, pp. 120, 121].
- 14 Oct 2016: Dolan attended a meeting at the Russian embassy and met with Peskov, Pavlov, and Dimitry Medvedev, in preparation for the Young President's Organization Conference [1, p. 142].
- 17 Oct 2016: FBI personnel held a TOP SECRET Lync call to address the Isikoff source as mentioned in the FISA application footnote per questions from the Deputy Attorney General Evans (i.e., was it Steele, Fusion GPS, or the law firm). Some FBI personnel later recalled that in the 4 Oct 2016 interview, Steele had acknowledged that he was the source for Isikoff's article but only when the FBI brought it up. Other FBI personnel do not recall any such admission by Steele 4 Oct 2016 [1, p. 234]. When Durham's team interviewed the attendees, they could not recall the TOP SECRET Lync conversation, other than "all of the Department's questions had been answered" (referring to the Department of Justice) [1, pp. 121, 122, 235].
- 17 Oct 2016: Carter Page was interviewed by the FBI CHS, and the conversation was recorded. Page told the CHS that he had never met with Sechin, and that he was unfamiliar with Divyekin [1, pp. 199, 200]. Page also noted that Sechin's company Rosneft had denied that a meeting with Page occurred [1, p. 201]. He also told the FBI CHS that he was taking a break from the Trump campaign [1, p. 202]. The FBI CHS provided the recording to FBI Supervisory Agent, who gave a summary to Peter Strzok, Auten, and Moffa: a) that Page did not deny knowing Sechin; and b) Page denied knowing Divyekin. But Page had in fact denied meeting both Sechin and Divyekin; and this exculpatory information was not included in the FISA application [1, pp. 202, 203]. The FBI CHS also discussed with Page "the possible establishment of a think tank to be located in London focused on Russia's relations with the West"; and Page alluded to the possibility that Russia might be willing to fund it [1, p. 202].
- 18 Oct 2016: The FISA application was revised, including a revised footnote; this time it said that Steele was not the source for Isikoff because Steele had told the FBI that he had provided his information only to Fusion GPS and the FBI. The footnote is false: the FBI already knew that Steele had provided his information to Nuland, and had already assessed that Steele was Isikoff's source [1, pp. 121, 122, 234, 235]. (Steele later admitted that he and others from Fusion GPS had provided information to various journalists, including *Yahoo News* [1, p. 122]). "It seems reasonable to surmise that the FBI's assessment of the *Yahoo News* article radically changed in order to protect the FISA application" [1, p. 123]. The FISA application also states:
"Source #1 maintains a network of sub-sources, who, in many cases, utilize their own sub-sources. The source reporting in this application, which was provided to the FBI by Source #1, is derived primarily from a [redacted], who uses a network of sub-sources. Thus, neither Source #1 nor the [redacted] had direct access to the information being reported by the sub-sources identified herein ..." [1, p. 228].
(Note: Source #1 here is Christopher Steele (known at this time to the FBI); the reporting source was Danchenko, not known at this time by the FBI).
Also in the FISA application was a statement that a sub-source had stated there was a "conspiracy between Trump's campaign and the Russian leadership, orchestrated by Manafort and using Page as an intermediary." But the FBI did not make any commentary on the reliability of this sub-source (whom the FBI did not know) [1, p. 228, 229].
The application also states: "As the activities discussed herein involve Page aiding, abetting, or conspiring with Russian Government officials and elements of the [Russian Intelligence Services] in

clandestine intelligence activities, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, including 18 U. S. C. § 371 (Conspiracy), 18 U. S. C. § 951 (Agents of Foreign Governments) and 22 U. S. C. §§ 612, et seq. (Foreign Agents Registration Act)." [1, p. 229]

But "the application did not discuss the standard, or explain how it was met, beyond what is stated" [1, p. 229].

18 Oct 2016: A series of emails occurred between Mark Hosenball of *Reuters* and Fusion GPS co-founder Peter Fritsch regarding the Alfa Bank allegations [1, p. 264]:

a) Hosenball to Fritsch: "anything new Russkie/Donald wise?";

b) Fritsch to Hosenball: "do the [expletive] Alfa Bank secret comms story. It's hugely important. Forget the WikiLeaks sideshow";

c) Hosenball to Fritsch: "The problem with the story at this point is that my cyber colleagues cannot satisfy themselves about the authenticity of some of the key data, which they say from what they can tell is NOT public data. We are in contact with your experts via different channels but my colleague in Silicon Valley still hasn't got the confidence he says he needs to understand where all the data originated. If you can help with this please do ...";

d) Fritsch to Hosenball: "It's everyone's problem. Call [the university researcher]."

19 Oct 2016: Steele issued another report, claiming: a) Michael Cohen was occupied in covering up Trump's ties to Russia; and b) Michael Cohen was trying to contain scandals involving Manafort and Page. This information came from Galkina [1, p. 159].

20 Oct 2016: Steele issued another report, claiming that Konstantin Kosachev, Head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Russian Duma, and "an important figure in the Trump campaign-Kremlin liaison operation" had met with Michael Cohen in Prague in Aug 2016. Danchenko later (cf. 28 Jan 2017) claimed it came from Galkina; Galkina later told the FBI that she was not aware of any meeting in Prague involving Cohen. The FBI never found any evidence that Cohen had met with Russians in Prague [1, p. 158].

21 Oct 2016: The FBI submitted, and the FISC approved the first FISA warrant on Carter Page (cf. 21 Sep 2016); containing the 18 Oct 2016 revised footnote [1, pp. 73, 103, 122, 241]. The FBI omitted that it knew that Steele had been hired by Fusion GPS to do opposition research on Trump, and that he was indirectly financed by the Clinton campaign [1, p. 125]. It also omitted the fact that Page had previously been a contact for another government agency between 2008 and 2013, although the Crossfire Hurricane investigators knew of it [1, p. 185]. It also omitted the fact that FBI CHS's interview with Page (cf. 20 Aug 2016) contradicted claims in the Steele Report, which the FBI did not bother to check (including failing to check Page's phone and email records to see if he knew Manafort) [1, pp. 195, 196]. It also claimed that Page was still involved in the campaign, whereas Page had stated (cf. 17 Oct 2016) that he was taking a break from it, and that Kellyanne Conway had stated that Page was no longer involved in the campaign [1, pp. 201, 203, 204].

22 Oct 2016: Franklin Foer of *Slate Magazine* emailed one of the university researchers involved in the Trump-Alfa Bank white papers, and asked him for assistance on the "Alfa Bank/Trump story" [1, p. 264]

23 Oct 2016: An FBI CHS (who was also a longtime acquaintance of Papadopoulos) met with Papadopoulos; this was the first of 23 recorded interviews between 23 Oct 2016 and 6 May 2017. During those 23 meetings (totaling 120 hours), the CHS baited Papadopoulos 200 times with leading questions, and 174 of them were exculpatory. Papadopoulos denied numerous times that there was any connection between the Trump campaign and the Russians [1, p. 223]. But none of these were included in the subsequent FISA applications [1, p. 223].

~ 25 Oct 2016: Fritsch forwarded to Franklin Foer of *Slate Magazine* a tweet by Senate majority Leader Harry Reid that stated that Reid had "talked with top National Security officials who say that [the

- FBI Director Comey] possesses explosive information about Trump's ties to Russia"; Fritsch then added: "time to hurry" [1, p. 264]. Foer replied with an email containing the first 250 words of a partial draft of an article about Trump and Alfa Bank, for Fritsch's review [1, p. 264].
- 29 Oct 2016: An FBI CHS (the longtime acquaintance of Papadopoulos) had a meeting with Papadopoulos; the CHS asked leading questions about the DNC hacking, and Papadopoulos denied knowing anything about it, and denied that the Trump campaign was involved in it. Papadopoulos speculated that any foreign government could have done it [1, pp. 224, 225]. None of this was contained in the subsequent FISA applications [1, p. 225].
- 31 Oct 2016: Franklin Foer published his article in *Slate Magazine* ("Was a Trump Server Communicating with Russia?") about the alleged connection between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank (which had already been disproven by the FBI, cf. 4 Oct 2016) [1, p. 264]. It discussed the allegations Sussmann had provided to the FBI [1, p. 265].
- 31 Oct 2016: The *New York Times* published an article stating the false claims about connections between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank of Moscow. It also stated that the FBI had received data, but the FBI's analysis did not show "any conclusive or direct link" between Trump organization and the Alfa Bank. The *New York Times* had been provided the false allegations by Sussmann and Fusion GPS, accompanied by statements issued by the Clinton campaign [1, pp. 17, 95, 96, 265]. Similar stories were published by *Slate Magazine* and *Mother Jones*. It is evident that Fusion GPS and the Clinton campaign had fabricated the Trump-Alfa ties, since Glenn Simpson had been providing the information to the media [1, pp. 95, 96]. The Clinton campaign then issued press releases and tweets about the alleged secret communications between Trump and Alfa Bank [1, pp. 264, 265].
- 1 Nov 2016: Glenn Simpson emailed David Corn of *Mother Jones* regarding connections between Millian and Trump [1, p. 183].
- 8 Nov 2016: Donald Trump was elected 45th president.
- 9 Nov 2016: Kevin Clinesmith wrote a text stating "vive la resistance", referring to resistance to Trump's upcoming administration [1, p. 50]. "Clinesmith played a central role in the Page FISA process" [1, p. 50].
- ~ 15 Nov 2016 ff: People connected to the Clinton campaign and other Democratic operatives planned additional efforts to research and disseminate materials concerning "election interference", with the goal of continuing to make claims about ties between Trump and Russia. Former Clinton campaign Chairman John Podesta began to organize a "Research Project", a non-profit organization to research election interference [1, pp. 276-278].
- 16 Nov 2016: Peter Stone of Fusion GPS emailed Berkowitz of Fusion GPS regarding connections between Millian and Trump (i.e., internal coordination) [1, p. 183].
- 17 Nov 2016: The FBI ended its association with Steele as a source "for disclosing his status as a CHS while providing information to the media regarding his work with Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton campaign and the DNC against Trump" [1, p. 109]. However, the FBI continued to use Steele as a source, with Bruce Ohr as the conduit between them [1, p. 110].
- 23 Nov 2016: Mark Hosenball of *Reuters* emailed Berkowitz and Simpson of Fusion GPS regarding connections between Millian and Trump [1, p. 183].
- 14 Dec 2016: Michael Sussmann sent an email to CIA General Counsel and requested a meeting to discuss allegations against Trump [1, p. 267].
- 15 Dec 2016: The FBI CHS interviewed Carter Page for a third time, also recorded [1, p. 205]. Most of the discussion involved an idea to set up a UK-sponsored economics think tank in London; and the CHS reminded Page of his comment at the last meeting (cf. 17 Oct 2016) that the Russians were interested in funding part of it. Page also informed the FBI CHS that he was under investigation by the FBI [1, p. 205].

- 20 Dec 2016: The CIA responded to Sussmann's request for a meeting (cf. 14 Dec 2016); declining it and recommending Sussmann discuss the matter with the FBI [1, p. 267].
- ~22 Dec 2016: The FBI CHS that had interviewed Page told an FBI case agent and an FBI analyst that, upon seeing Sechin's name in a newspaper, he (the CHS) recalled that Page had told him that he (Page) had met with Sechin. But the FBI case agent and analyst failed to listen to the 15 Dec 2016 recorded interview between the FBI CHS and Page, in which it would have been obvious that no such statement had been made by Page [1, pp. 205-207, 242, 243]. In actuality, Senator Harry Reid had made the accusation that Page had met with Sechin per an article in the *Washington Post* (by Josh Rogin). In any case, the FBI continued to use the false claim that Page was in contact with Sechin in the following FISA applications [1, pp. 205-207].
- late Dec 2016: The FBI learned that the "primary sub-source" for the "Steele dossier" was Igor Danchenko, a U. S. based Russian national living in Washington DC [1, pp. 11, 13, 126]. However, this fact was never included in the two subsequent FISA applications against Carter Page [1, p. 126].
- ~ 5 Jan 2017: The FBI applied to the FISC for a renewal of the initial FISA warrant against Page (cf. 21 Oct 2016) [1, p. 208].

2017

- 10 Jan 2017: *BuzzFeed* published the Steel Dossier [1, pp. 96, 159].
- 11 Jan 2017: Dolan called Danchenko and expressed his suspicion that Danchenko was the source for the Steele dossier "because it was a London operation" and that Steele worked for Orbis in London. Danchenko told Dolan he did not know who the source was but would try to find out [1, p. 159].
- 11 Jan 2017: The New England Supervisory Agent (NESA) (cf. 21 Jul 2016, 23 Aug 2016, 23 Sep 2016) traded emails with an FBI Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent (SSA): a) NESA to SSA: was there anything gleaned from the information sent in July; b) SSA to NESA: the FBI Headquarters team had received the same information from a different source (Steele), and that the different source was working with the same investigative team that the New England CHS was using. The "different source" was Steele, and the "investigative firm" was Fusion GPS. The NESA did not learn until later that the ultimate source was Fusion GPS [1, p. 65].
- ~ 12 Jan 2017: The FBI received approval from the FISC to continue surveillance on Carter Page for another 90 days (a renewal of the 21 Oct 2016 application). The FISA application included several "misrepresentations and mischaracterizations of the recorded conversations" with Page [1, pp. 207, 208].
- 12 Jan 2017: The FBI met with Danchenko with the intent to recruit him as a CHS, despite the previous counterespionage investigation of him that had been closed in Mar 2011 [1, p. 132]. The purpose of recruiting him was to corroborate anything about the allegations against Trump in the Steele dossier [1, p. 132].
- 13 Jan 2017: Dolan sent an email to a U. S. acquaintance stating that: a) a "Russian agent" (without naming Danchenko) who once worked for him was the source for the anti-Trump dossier (i.e., Steele's source); b) his client in Cyprus (Servers.com) had been accused of organizing the hacking of the DNC; and c) that Steele was the source for the anti-Trump dossier. Danchenko was not known publicly as Steele's source [1, p. 160].
- ~ 15 Jan 2017: The non-profit "Research Organization" was established (cf. 15 Nov 2016) to investigate "election interference"; it entered into a contract with Fusion GPS and Steele's firm Orbis (a.k.a. Walsingham Partners). The "Research Organization" eventually researched the data regarding the Alfa Bank allegations and found no evidence of a secret channel. It also investigated the Yotaphone data, but ended up being "skeptical" about it [1, pp. 277-279].

- ~ 15 Jan 2017: The FBI closed its investigation into the alleged connection between the Trump organization and Alfa Bank (cf. 19 Sep 2016); "the FBI was unable to substantiate any of the allegations in the white paper" [1, p. 263].
- 25 Jan 2017: An FBI CHS met with Carter Page for the fourth time, and the meeting was recorded. Page asked the CHS if he knew Steele, and the CHS said no. Page speculated that the Richard Dearlove of MI-6 must have known Steele; thus Page denied any connection to claims made in the Steele Reports. This was never mentioned in the third and fourth FISA applications [1, p. 209]. The FBI CHS then brought up the think tank (cf. 15 Dec 2016) and told Page that if he could get some Russian money, the CHS could help him get some U. S. money to fund it. Page thought the Russians were on board with helping with funding, but did not make any commitment to trying to establish it. Page also told the CHS that the FBI's investigation of him was based on false information [1, pp. 209-211].
- 25 Jan 2017: The FBI CHS (the one who was a longtime acquaintance of Papadopoulos, cf. 29 Oct 2016) met with Papadopoulos regarding media speculation that Sergei Millian, whom Papadopoulos knew, was the source for the Steele reports. Papadopoulos mentioned that he had never been in Russia, and had done nothing in regard to alleged collusion between Trump and the Russians [1, pp. 225, 226]. None of this was mentioned in the subsequent FISA applications [1, p. 226].
- 24-26 Jan 2017: Having learned that Danchenko was Steele's primary source, the FBI granted Danchenko immunity, and the Crossfire Hurricane investigators (including Auten) met with Danchenko and his legal counsel. "Danchenko was unable to provide any corroborating evidence to support the Steele allegations." [1, pp. 127, 132, 133] Also, Danchenko's comments were inconsistent with Steele's comments made to the FBI between Oct 2016 and Sep 2017, but the FISC was never informed of these inconsistencies [1, pp. 13]. The FBI also learned that contrary to Steele's assertion that his source was living in Russia, Danchenko lived in Washington, DC and rarely traveled.
- 27 Jan 2017: The FBI interviewed Papadopoulos; during the conversation Papadopoulos told the FBI about a person associated with a London-based entity who had told him about the Russians having 'dirt' on Clinton. Papadopoulos gave the FBI the name and contact information; however, Papadopoulos stated that he had received this before he had become a Trump advisor, when in fact he had received it after his appointment. Also Papadopoulos downplayed his understanding of the person's connections to Russian government officials. Also, Papadopoulos "misled the Agents about his attempts to use the individual and a female associated with that person to arrange a meeting between the Trump campaign and Russian officials". For these, Papadopoulos was charged and pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI [1, p. 223].
- ~28 Jan 2017: Crossfire Hurricane investigators interviewed Danchenko about the source ("Source E") of the collusion claim; Danchenko claimed that it was received in an anonymous phone call that sounded like Sergei Millian, a person Danchenko had never met or spoken to. The FBI never checked any phone records to see if the call could have come from Millian [1, p. 16]. Danchenko also claimed that the information about the alleged meeting between Michael Cohen and Russian came from Galkina [1, p. 159].
- late Jan 2017: One of the Crossfire Hurricane investigators transferred back to the FBI Washington Field office, and was replaced by an experienced counterintelligence agent. He was informed by Jennifer Boone that his primary task was to renew the Carter Page FISA application; he realized that the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was being tightly controlled by Strzok, Auten, and Moffa, and neither he nor his predecessor believed Carter Page was a risk to national security [1, p. 104]. Boone knew that there was "heavy involvement" by McCabe [1, p. 105].
- 31 Jan 2017: Sussmann, having been unsuccessful in obtaining a meeting with CIA General Counsel (cf. 14, 20 Dec 2016), met with a retired CIA employee; he told the retired employee that he had a client ("an engineer with a number of patents") who wanted to provide information about Trump to the

CIA; that the client did not want to provide it to the FBI because; a) he "did not trust the FBI"; and b) "did not believe the FBI had the resources to deal with the allegations". Sussmann also told him that if the CIA did not investigate the allegations, he would provide the information to the *New York Times*. The retired CIA employee then drafted a memo to describing the meeting and sent it to active CIA employees, who then scheduled a meeting with Sussmann (cf. 9 Feb 2017) [1, p. 267].

9 Feb 2017: The FBI interviewed Danchenko about the some of the information he had provided to Steele. "Danchenko claimed that the Ritz Carlton allegations he provided to Steele were nothing more than 'rumor and speculation', and that most of the information he gathered for Steele was the product of casual conversation with people in his social circle, including those parts of the Steele reports used in the Page FISA applications" [1, pp. 11, 127, 138]. It became obvious then, contrary to the initial FISA application (cf. 18 Oct 2016), that Danchenko was not operating a network of sub-sources; he was reporting gossip to Steele [1, p. 138]. Danchenko also admitted that his friend Olga Galkina had provided some information that ended up in the Steele dossier [1, pp. 140, 162]. Also, Danchenko related the events concerning the allegations (cf. late Jul/early Aug, 2016/095) that Trump campaign was colluding with Russia: a) Danchenko had received Millian's email address from Dmitry Zlodorev and had emailed him, but never received a response; b) the information about Trump-Russia came from an anonymous call in late Jul 2016 from someone he claimed that he thought was Sergei Millian; c) he was supposed to meet with the person he thought was Millian in a New York bar, but that person never showed up [1, p. 173, 174]. Danchenko was unable to provide any phone records or evidence to suggest this call ever occurred [1, p. 175]. The FBI later learned (cf. 14 Nov 2017) that Danchenko never had met Millian, nor was Danchenko in New York the day he was supposed to have met with the caller [1, p. 174].

9 Feb 2017: Sussmann met with CIA employees, and provided "an updated set of allegations -- including the Alfa Bank and additional allegations relating to Trump". Sussmann also stated, similar to what he had told FBI General Counsel Baker (cf. 19 Sep 2016), that he was not representing a "particular client"; however, he was in fact representing Joffe and possibly others [1, pp. 267-269]. Among the updated allegations: a) Trump and his associates were using telephones from the Russian mobile telephone provider Yotaphone in the vicinity of the White House; and b) provided data to the CIA that he claimed "reflected suspicious DNS hookups by these entities of domains affiliated with Yotaphone" [1, pp. 268]. Sussmann provided two thumb drives and four paper documents that he claimed supported these allegations [1, p. 269]. The four documents were titled: a) Network Analysis of Yota-Related Resolution Events"; b) YotaPhone CSV File Collected on December 11th, 2016"; c) "Summary of Trump Network Connections"; and d) "ONINT on Trump Network Communications" [1, p. 269]. The thumb drives contained CSV files with IP addresses, domain names, and date/time stamps [1, p. 269]. This data was in fact (as uncovered by Durham's team), assembled by Joffe's team based on DNS traffic from Trump Tower, Trump's apartment in New York, the Executive Office of the President, and Spectrum Health of Michigan [1, p. 268].

14 Feb 2017: The *New York Times* published a story, citing four unnamed current and former U. S. intelligence officials, claiming contacts between the Trump campaign and Russian intelligence, namely that: a) "U. S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies intercepted communications of members of Trump's campaign and other Trump associates that showed repeated contacts with senior Russian intelligence officials in the year before the election"; b) "former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort had been one of the individuals picked up on the intercepted calls"; and c) "the intercepted communications between Trump associates and Russians had been initially captured by NSA". The FBI knew all of these were false, and Peter Strzok himself refuted all of them in an internal critique [1, pp. 106, 107].

14 Feb 2017 - 18 Jul 2017: Joffe emailed one of the tech company employees asking him to perform searches of internet traffic to establish Trump-Russia connections. These searches continued until at least 18 Jul 2017, but no evidence was discovered [1, pp. 275-277].

- 15 Feb 2017: The CIA completed its analysis of the data provided by Sussmann (cf. 9 Feb 2017); it issued a report called "Special Project - Trump Organization Yotaphone and Email Server Network Communications Analysis". The CIA "concluded that the materials that Sussmann provided were neither 'technically plausible' nor did they 'withstand technical scrutiny', and further, that none of the materials showed any linkages between the Trump campaign or Trump Organization and any Russian foreign intelligence service or the Alfa Bank" [1, pp. 269, 270]. Also, one of the thumb drives contained hidden data revealing the name and email address of one of the tech company executives originally tasked by Joffe (the same woman quoted above, cf. 16 Sep 2016) [1, p. 270].
- 1 Mar 2017: The *New York Times* published a second article regarding contacts between the Trump campaign and Russia, and repeating some of the false allegations made in the 14 Feb 2017 article [1, p. 107]. Peter Strzok again refuted these internally [1, p. 107]. The Steele dossier was the only information the FBI had [1, p. 107].
- 7 Mar 2017: The FBI hired Danchenko as a paid confidential human source (CHS), although nothing he had provided to Steele turned out to be correct [1, pp. 13, 133], and Danchenko had in fact been the subject of an FBI counterintelligence investigation in 2009-2011 [1, pp. 14, 132]. Special Agent Kevin Helson became Danchenko's FBI handler [1, p. 133, 134].
- 8 Mar 2017: Crossfire Hurricane investigators once again expressed their frustration at having being prohibited from interviewing Carter Page up to this time; they speculate as to whether it is Comey, McCabe, or Priestap that is behind the restriction (cf. 25 Sep 2016, 13 Oct 2016) [1, pp. 197, 198].
- 9 Mar 2017: The FBI interviewed Carter Page [1, p. 200].
- 10 Mar 2017: The FBI interviewed Carter Page [1, p. 200].
- 20 Mar 2017: FBI Director Comey testified before Congress that the FBI was investigating "the Trump campaign and possible contacts with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign" (i.e., the Crossfire Hurricane investigation) [1, p. 226].
- 20 Mar 2017: The FBI CHS (the one who was a longtime acquaintance of Papadopoulos, cf. 29 Oct 2016, 25 Jan 2016) met with Papadopoulos again and discussed Comey's testimony earlier that day. Papadopoulos stated that any allegation of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia "was the craziest thing I ever heard of in my life" [1, pp. 226, 227]. None of this denial appeared in the subsequent FISA applications [1, p. 227].
- 22 Mar 2017: Senators Jack Reed and Mark Warner wrote a letter to FBI Director James Comey asking that the FBI open an investigation into reports that "a server belonging to the Trump Organization was purposefully communicating with servers belonging to a major Russian bank and the Spectrum Health organization in Michigan during the 2016 election." It enclosed an "untitled white paper of unknown authorship", which included a summary of the Alfa Bank allegations that had been previously provided to the FBI and CIA by Sussmann [1, p. 272]. Since it had already been refuted by both the FBI and CIA, the FBI took no action on this request [1, p. 273].
- 24 Mar 2017: Auten informed Helson that Danchenko had been the target of a previous counterintelligence investigation, but the case against Danchenko was "interesting but was not a significant" matter [1, p. 134]. Helson failed to contact other FBI agents who were familiar with the previous case, and was "generally dismissive" of the prior case [1, p. 134].
- 30 Mar 2017: The FBI interviewed Carter Page [1, p. 200]. Page denied the allegations regarding the Trump campaign, Sechin, Manafort, and Divyekin [1, p. 241].
- 31 Mar 2017: The FBI interviewed Carter Page [1, p. 200]. Page denied the allegations regarding the Trump campaign Sechin, Manafort, and Divyekin [1, p. 241].
- 31 Mar 2017: The FBI CHS (the one who was a longtime acquaintance of Papadopoulos, cf. 29 Oct 2016, 25 Jan 2017, 20 Mar 2-17) met with Papadopoulos again and discussed the allegations of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. Papadopoulos stated he had nothing to do with the Rus-

- sians and did not believe the Russians interfered in U. S. elections [1, pp. 227, 228]. None of this appeared in the subsequent FISA applications [1, p. 228].
- ~15 Apr 2017: One of Mueller's team members was tasked with validating or disproving the Steele reports [1, p. 166].
- 8 May 2017: One of Senator Reed's staffers sent a follow-up letter to the FBI Office of Congressional Affairs (cf. 22 Mar 2017, 27 Apr 2017), it also noted that the source of the information in the white papers wanted to remain anonymous, but was represented by Michael Sussmann [1, p. 273].
- 27 Apr 2017: Senator Reed sent a second letter to Director Comey (cf. 22 Mar 2017); this one also included a white paper of unknown authorship, detailing the allegations of Yotaphones being used within the Trump Organization and Spectrum Health (which it correlated with Trump campaign and transition team visits to Michigan). The paper was titled "An Unusual Russian Phone Operating on Trump Organization Networks and in the Executive Office of the President"; it claimed that Yotaphones were being used in the Trump Organization until 15 Dec 2016, and then were being used at the Executive Office of the President, thus showing that they were being used by members of Trump's transition team [1, p. 273]. Since it had already been refuted by the CIA (cf. 15 Feb 2017), the FBI took no action on this request [1, p. 273]. The FBI later came to the same conclusion during the Durham investigation [1, pp. 286, 287].
- 9 May 2017: James Comey was fired as FBI Director.
- 31 May 2017: Moffa sent an email to Strzok, apparently confirming that the FBI had disproven both the Alfa Bank and the Yotaphone allegations against Trump [1, p. 273].
- ~ 12 Jun 2017: The fourth Page FISA warrant was approved; it still contained Danchenko's claims about Trump-Russia collusion (cf. late Jul/early Aug 2016, 2016/095) [1, p. 185]; it also omitted exculpatory information from the four interviews with Page (cf. 20 Aug 2016, 17 Oct 2016, 15 Dec 2016, 25 Jan 2017), and also omitted information regarding Steele and Danchenko (cf. 28 Jan 2017) [1, pp. 210-212].
- 12 Jun 2016: By this time (starting in the spring of 2017), the FBI began to investigate Dolan's role. Auten emailed Helson and a member of Mueller's team speculating on how Dolan could have been in the path between the Kremlin and Steele [1, p. 164].
- 15 Jun 2016: Kevin Clinesmith sent an email to the "other government agency" (OGA) that Page had helped earlier, asking whether Page had ever been a source. The liaison for the OGA replied by email the same day, including a reference to the memorandum (cf. 17 Aug 2016) along with a list of relevant OGA documents [1, p. 187].
- 15 Jun 2017: Kevin Clinesmith, having received confirmation from the "other government agency" that Carter Page had been a source for them, omitted this fact in an email to the FBI Office of General Counsel, and also omitted his original email to the OGA (cf. 15 Jun 2016); Clinesmith stated that Page was "a U. S. subsource of a source". Clinesmith also sent an email to an attorney at the FBI Office of Intelligence (who was working on the fourth FISA application) requesting a time to talk [1, p. 187, 188].
- 15 Jun 2017: The FBI (Helson) interviewed Danchenko; he denied that Dolan had provided any information that was in the Steele dossier (which was false) [1, pp. 160-162, 164]. This was the first time the FBI asked about Dolan, even though they knew on 4 Oct 2016 that Dolan had connections to the Steele reports [1, p. 164]. Shortly afterward, Helson was told by the Mueller team (Auten) not to interview Dolan directly [1, p. 164].
- 16 Jun 2017: Clinesmith had a phone call with Office of Intelligence Attorney; afterward he forwarded to the attorney the email from the OGA liaison, but omitting his original to the OGA [1, p. 188].
- 19 Jun 2017: Clinesmith had a Lync conversation with a Supervisory Special Agent; Clinesmith told him that Page "was never a source" and that "the [OGA] confirmed explicitly that he was never a source".

Clinesmith then forwarded to the Supervisory agent the email from 15 Jun 2016 that he had altered, which now read [1, p. 189]:

"My recollection is that Page was or is "[digraph] and not a source but the [documents will explain the details. If you need a formal definition for the FISA, please let me know and we'll work up some language and get it cleared for use" [1, pp. 189, 190].

29 Jun 2017: The fourth FISA application was submitted to the FISC, which indicated that Page had never been a source for the OGA. (The purpose of Clinesmith's change was to avoid having to make an inconvenient footnote in the FISA application) [1, p. 187-191]

~ 15 Jul 2017: A member of Mueller's team was assigned to review the FBI's databases regarding the FBI's knowledge of Galkina; they discovered: a) "Dolan was connected to both Danchenko and Galkina"; and b); Dolan had "extensive ties to the Kremlin and Russian government officials, including Peskov" [1, p. 166].

17 Jul 2017: The U. S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence interviewed CIA Director James Clapper. He was asked if he was aware of any evidence connecting the Trump campaign to Russia; he answered "no" [1, p. 62].

Aug 2017: FBI agents attached to Mueller's tem began an investigation into Sergei Millian's involvement in any Russian attempts to influence the 2016 election [1, p. 185] (See the later action with regard to Millian, 17 Jan 2019).

2 Aug 2017: Christopher Wray succeeded James Comey as FBI Director (cf. 9 May 2017).

~ 15 Aug 2017: Auten and other members of the Mueller team traveled to Cyrus and interviewed Galkina to determine if she had provided any information to Danchenko that was in the Steele reports. Galkina initially refused to discuss Dolan, but on the second day admitted that she had discussed Steele report information with Dolan [1, pp. 166, 167].

late Aug 2017: Two investigators on Mueller's team briefed the rest of Mueller's team (including Auten and Jeannie Rhee) about Dolan, Danchenko, and Galkina; the rest of the team supported continuing to investigate Dolan [1, pp. 167, 168].

1 Sep 2017: A member of the Mueller team drafted a case opening document for Dolan, citing: a) "Dolan's connections to Danchenko and Galkina"; b) "Dolan's connections to the Democrat party"; and c) "Dolan's connections to the Kremlin" [1, p. 168].

7 Sep 2017: Auten (on Mueller's team) ordered the Mueller investigator that had drafted the case on Dolan (cf. 1 Sep 2017) to cease all interest in Dolan [1, p. 168].

17, 18 Sep 2017: The investigators on the Mueller team and FBI interviewed Steele; Steele told them that Dolan may have been the source for the report in the Steele dossier that discussed Paul Manafort [1, p. 138, 168, 169]. Steele also told the FBI that his primary sub-source (Danchenko) had a "friend of a friend" who had contact with Peskov; and that his sub-source (Danchenko) also had a sub-source who was in contact with Pavlov and was also close to Medvedev [1, p. 142, 143]. However, the Durham team later learned that Danchenko had no relationship to Pavlov [1, p. 143]. Steele also stated that he had provided information to the U. S. media, specifically *Mother Jones* [1, p. 204].

18, 19 Sep 2016: The Mueller team and the FBI interviewed Steele. Steele them that Danchenko had told Steele that he had met Millian several times (but is false - Danchenko never met Millian) [1, pp. 175, 176].

22 Sep 2017: Members of Mueller's team met with FBI personnel, including Rhee and Auten, to discuss the recent interview with Steele (cf. 17-19 Sep 2017). Rhee's opinion was that the Steele Reports were outside the scope of Mueller's investigation; also FBI Deputy Assistant Director David Archey directed Auten and others stop attempting to corroborate the Steele Reports [1, p. 169]. It is clear however, that the Steele reports did fall within the mandate of the Mueller investigation [1, p. 169].

- Oct 2017: John Podesta learned that Fusion GPS had been paid by both the Clinton campaign and the DNC to carry out the Steele dossier and other opposition research. Although he knew that Perkins Coie was doing opposition research, he did not know that Perkins Coie has hired Fusion GPS to do the opposition research [1, p. 277].
- 17 Oct 2017: The Mueller team and FBI personnel met (including Auten); Mueller leadership directed that: a) Dolan was outside the Mueller mandate; b) the investigators had too few resources to focus on Dolan; and c) "the FBI Washington Field Office could task Danchenko regarding Dolan" [1, p. 169]. The Mueller team leadership then ordered the Mueller investigators to stop work on Dolan [1, pp. 169, 170]. It turned out that Auten, Helson, and one of Mueller's investigators favored interviewing Dolan, but were overruled [1, p. 171]. The Durham investigation never got a clear answer as to why Dolan was excluded from the Mueller investigation [1, p. 170]. There was some concern on the part of some Mueller investigators that the FBI decision to ignore Dolan was based on political considerations, although there was no proof of it [1, pp. 170, 171].
- 23 Oct 2017: The FBI (Helson) interviewed Danchenko; Danchenko mentioned Dolan as a person that Danchenko was concerned about due to his ties to the Russian government, including Peskov and Pavlov [1, p. 162].
- 11 Nov 2017: The FBI interviewed Danchenko; Danchenko admitted that he thought the anonymous caller (cf. lat Jul/early Aug 2016, 2016/095) was Millian based on a YouTube video; and that he had not informed Steele that he did not know Millian [1, p. 173].
- 18 Dec 2017: Sussmann testified before the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding his conversation with James Baker (cf. 19 Sep 2017) and the CIA (cf. 9 Feb 2017); he admitted that he was in fact representing a client in both instances [1, pp. 270, 271]. However, it concealed the fact that his only client was Joffe, when in fact his clients regarding Alfa Bank also included the Clinton campaign [1, pp. 271, 272].
- 21 Dec 2017: Helson complained to the Mueller team about their unwillingness to let him interview Dolan [1, p. 165].

2018

- 9 Jan 2018: Helson complained again to the Mueller team about their unwillingness to let him interview Dolan [1, p. 165].
- 17 Jan 2018: Helson complained again to the Mueller team about their unwillingness to let him interview Dolan [1, p. 165].
- 28 Aug 2018: The U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary Joint with the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight interviewed Bruce Ohr; they discovered that Bruce Ohr had provided his wife's reports on Millian to Crossfire Hurricane investigators [1, p. 181].
- ~3 Oct 2018: Apparently the FBI learned sometime earlier in 2018 "that the Russians had access to sensitive U. S. government information years earlier that would have allowed them to identify Steele's sub-sources. An experienced FBI analyst assessed that as a result of their access to the information, Steele's sub-sources could have been compromised by the Russians at a point in time prior to the date of the first Steele dossier report" [1, pp. 107, 108]. After they told the FBI Counterintelligence and Cyber executive management about this, they were subsequently told not to write any more memorandums on the subject, because "issues relating to Steele were under intense scrutiny" [1, pp. 107, 108]
- 17 Oct 2018: Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Dina Corsi directed the FBI analysts "not to document any recommendations, context, or analysis in the memorandum they were preparing"

(regarding Steele). These directions were "highly unusual". One of the FBI analysts "was so concerned about the failure to fully exploit the materials involving Steele subsource information (and the possible need to bring information already exploited to the attention of the FISC) that she raised her concerns about the FBI's lack of action in an email to her supervisor in the hope of having the issues explored further" (also sent to other FBI employees) [1, p. 108].

Nov 2018: Several members of Senator Reed's staff met in Washington, D. C. (Hart Office Building) with a two university researchers. This had been coordinated through DARPA and Joffe. After an initial briefing on a DARPA project, they and several staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) met in a secure conference room. The Committee members brought up a news article about Trump, Russia and Alfa Bank, and asked the university researchers if they could provide any help. One of the university researchers stated that it would be inappropriate for a public university to do that, and recommended that the Committee staffer contact DARPA. A staff member of the HPSCI told them that Adam Schiff would soon be taking over the HPSCI (which the university researchers took as a mild threat). The university researchers left the room (one of them had previously done work on the Alfa Bank allegation). The university researcher later mentioned this incident to a DARPA program manager, but obtained no reaction [1, pp. 280-282].

2019

17 Jan 2019: The FBI closed its investigation of Sergei Millian, concluding, "the investigation found no confirmation that [Millian] was directed to engage in activities related to Russian Government efforts to interfere with the 2016 U. S. Presidential election" [1, p. 185].

May 2019: The FBI conducted a Human Source Validation Report (HSVR) on Danchenko, detailing his contacts with Russian intelligence operatives, and false statements made on Danchenko's visa application and immigration documents. The FBI personnel who performed the HSVR recommended that Danchenko be retained as a CHS, but that steps should be taken to mitigate concerns about Danchenko, including a polygraph and controls on his reports. None of these steps were taken [1, pp. 134-136].

13 May 2019: Attorney General William Barr directed John Durham to conduct a preliminary review of events related to the 2016 Presidential election [1, p. 1].

5 Sep 2019: Durham interviewed the Case Agent in New York about the Carter Page investigation (cf. 3 Apr 2016); the case agent stated it was a "waste of money" [1, p. 103].

9 Oct 2019: Durham interviewed Alexander Downer regarding "Paragraph Five (cf. 16 May 2016); Downer's recollection differs from what the other diplomat stated. "Rather, Downer's recollection was that Papadopoulos simply stated "that Russians have information" and that was all" [1, p. 52].

2020

6 Feb 2020: Attorney General Barr appointed Durham as Special Attorney to investigate the 2016 Presidential election [1, p. 1].

19 Feb 2020: Durham's team interviewed an analyst at FBI headquarters, and the story about the FBI analysts being prohibited from writing any more memorandums about Steele was revealed (cf. 3 Oct 2018, 17 Oct 2018) [1, pp. 107, 108].

17 Mar 2020: In a civil suit in the United Kingdom, Steele admitted that he and Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS had held numerous meetings with U. S. journalists and had shared information with them [1, p. 204].

- 21 Aug 2020: The Office of Special Counsel interviewed John Brennan about his receiving the Clinton Plan intelligence (cf. 27 Jul 2016). Brennan stated that he did not focus on the Clinton Plan, but did focus on the DNC hacking [1, p. 84]. He did not think he had seen the Clinton Plan intelligence prior to his phone call with James Comey 29 Jul 2016 [1, p. 84]. Brennan also commented [1, p. 297]:
"There was no effort at the CIA to restrict information because it was potentially embarrassing for Hilary Clinton ... Obama just wanted the right people involved."
- 29 Sep 2020: Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe sent a classified letter to Senator Lindsey Graham based on John Brennan's notes confirming that U. S. intelligence had learned from Russian intelligence that Hilary Clinton had approved the "Clinton Plan" (cf. 26 Jul 2016) ; that CIA Director Brennan had briefed President Obama 3 Aug 2016; and that this was forwarded to FBI Director James Comey and Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok on 7 Sep 2016 [1, pp. 81, 82]. Ratcliffe's letter states in part [1, p. 83]:
"In late July 2016, U. S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian intelligence analysis alleging that U. S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign to stir up a scandal against U. S. presidential candidate Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians' hacking of the Democratic National Committee. ...
The [intelligence community] does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication."
- 6 Oct 2020: DNI John Ratcliffe declassified Brennan's notes on the "Clinton Plan" [1, p. 82].
- 11 Oct 2020: Durham's team discovered that Danchenko has told others that he was responsible for 80% of the "raw intel" in the Steele dossier and half of the analysis thereof [1, pp. 13, 160].
- 19 Oct 2020: Attorney General Barr appointed Durham as Special Counsel to investigate the 2016 Presidential election, "based on extraordinary circumstances" [1, pp. 1, 2]. Specifically:
"The Special Counsel is authorized to investigate whether any federal official, employee, or any other person or entity violated the law in connection with the intelligence, counter-intelligence, or law-enforcement activities directed at the 2016 presidential campaigns, individual associated with those campaigns, and individual associated with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, including but not limited to Crossfire Hurricane and the investigation of Special Counsel Robert. S. Mueller, III."
A footnote to Durham's report [1, p. 2] states: We have not interpreted the Order [Special Counsel order] to as directing us to investigate the Department's handling of matter associated with the investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server. ... We also have not interpreted the Order as directing us to consider the handling of the investigation into President Trump opened by the FBI on May 16, 2017."
- 29 Oct 2020: The FBI officially closed Danchenko as a CHS, having paid him \$220,000 since 7 Mar 2017. But the FBI proposed to continue making additional payments to Danchenko totaling \$300,000 during the Durham investigation [1, pp. 136, 137]. All of this occurred despite the unresolved counterespionage case against Danchenko [1, p. 138]. Despite all the inconsistencies about Danchenko and his suspected involvement with Russian intelligence, the FBI kept him on the payroll. Some in the FBI regarded him as a valuable resource, while others did not think he was of much value. However, "the Assistant Director for Counterintelligence at the FBI Headquarters thought Danchenko was being paid for information he was providing the corroborated the Steele Dossier reporting, which, of course, was not the case because Danchenko never produced any such evidence" [1, p. 137].
- 21 Dec 2020: Attorney General Barr authorized Durham to access certain classified information in his investigation [1, p. 3].

30 Jun 2021: Durham's team interviewed an FBI Office of General Counsel attorney, who confirmed that Corsi had instructed the FBI analysts "not to write any more memoranda or analytical pieces and to provide their findings orally (cf. 17 Oct 2018) [1, p. 108]. The attorney recalled that Corsi's directive came from FBI leadership, but did not know who instructed Corsi [1, p. 108].

2022

5 Feb 2022: The Durham team interviewed Sergei Millian; Millian confirmed that he had never met or spoken to Danchenko [1, pp. 179, 180]. Millian also said he had received threats due to his alleged involvement in the Steele Reports (cf. 2016/095), but his involvement was in fact fabricated by Danchenko [1, p. 180].

18 May 2022: The Durham team interviewed Marc Elias, who "explained that Perkins Coie had hired Fusion for research and investigative services to assist Elias and Perkins Coie in representing the Clinton campaign. As part of those services, Fusion provided research and other services that were used to, among other things, promote the Alfa Bank allegations to the media and the FBI" [1, p. 245].

2023

Apr 2023: By this time, Durham's team had completed two trials, reviewed 1,000,000 documents, served over 190 grand jury subpoenas, executed 7 search warrants, obtained 5 orders for communications records, and made one request to a foreign government [1, .p. 4]

12 May 2023: John Durham released his final report.

5 Durham's Conclusions

Mr. Durham's overall conclusion states in part [1, pp. 17, 18]:

"Based on the review of Crossfire Hurricane and related intelligence activities, we conclude that the Department and the FBI failed to uphold their important mission of strict fidelity to the law in connection with certain events and activities described in this report. As noted, former FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith committed a criminal offense by fabricating language in an email that was material to the FBI obtaining a FISA surveillance order. In other instances, FBI personnel working on that same FISA application displayed, at best, a cavalier attitude towards accuracy and completeness. FBI personnel also repeatedly disregarded important requirements when they continued to seek renewals of that FISA surveillance while acknowledging -- both then and in hindsight -- that they did not genuinely believe there was probable cause to believe that the target was knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly helping another person in such activities. And certain personnel disregarded significant exculpatory information that should have prompted investigative restraint and re-examination.

Our investigation also revealed that senior FBI personnel displayed a serious lack of analytical rigor towards the information they received, especially information received from politically affiliated persons and entities. This information in part triggered and sustained Crossfire Hurricane and contributed to the subsequent need for Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. In particular, there was significant reliance on investigative leads provided or funded (directly or indirectly) by Trump's political opponents. The Department did not adequately examine or question these materials and the motivations of those providing them, even when at about the same time the Director of the FBI and others learned of significant and potentially contrary intelligence.

In light of the foregoing, there is a continuing need for the FBI and the Department to recognize that lack of analytical rigor, apparent confirmation bias, and an over-willingness to rely on information from individuals connected to political opponents caused investigators to fail to adequately consider alternative hypotheses and to act without appropriate objectivity or restraint in pursuing allegations of collusion or conspiracy between a U. S. political campaign and a foreign power. Although recognizing that in hindsight much is clearer, much of this also seems to have been clear at the time. We therefore believe it is important to examine past conduct to identify shortcomings and improve how the government carries out its most sensitive functions."

Mr. Durham's report also states that the FBI "simply ignored or in some fashion rationalized away" certain information because the various investigators had "confirmation bias" [1, p. 304]. He also mentioned that there was insufficient evidence of FBI crimes or misconduct to make a criminal case in a court [1, pp. 97, 98]. Instead, he points to "confirmation bias" as the cause for the FBI's actions. Mr. Durham pointed out that confirmation bias "is a common human tendency -- mostly unintentional -- for people to accept information and evidence that is consistent with what they already believe to be true, while ignoring or rejecting information that challenges those beliefs" [1, p. 303]. Here is Mr. Durham's list of FBI actions or inactions that he believes are evidence of confirmation bias [1, pp. 304, 305]:

- a. "The Australian diplomats told Crossfire Hurricane investigators that Papadopoulos never stated that he had any direct contact with the Russian nor did he provide any explicit information about an offer of assistance."
- b. "There was a complete lack of information from the Intelligence Community that corroborated the hypothesis upon which the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was predicated."
- c. "The FBI generally ignored significant exculpatory information provided by Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, and the [Trump senior foreign policy advisor] during recorded conversations with FBI CHS's."
- d. "The FBI failed to pursue investigative leads that were inconsistent with their theory of the case (e.g. Page's recorded denials of having any relationship with Paul Manafort), a fact about which there was available evidence."
- e. "The FBI failed to take Page up on the written offer he made to Director Comey to be interviewed about the allegation contained in Michael Isikoff *Yahoo News* article and instead opted to seek FISA surveillance of Page."
- f. "The FBI was willing to make use of the completely unvetted and uncorroborated Steele reporting in multiple FISA applications targeting a U. S. citizen, even after the Crossfire Hurricane investigators had determined that there were major conflicts between the reporting of Steele and his primary sub-source, Igor Danchenko -- conflicts the FBI incredibly failed to resolve."
- g. "The Crossfire Hurricane investigators did not even ask Steele about his role in providing information to Michael Isikoff as contained in the September 23, 2016 Yahoo News article -- information that essentially accused Carter Page of colluding with the Russians. And thereafter the same investigators demonstrated a willingness to contort the plain language of the article to suggest it was not Steele but Steele's employers who had given the information to Isikoff."
- h. "The FBI ignored that fact that at no time before, during, or after Crossfire Hurricane were investigators able to corroborate a single substantive allegation in the Steele dossier reporting."
- i. "There was a complete failure on the part of the FBI to even examine -- never mind resolve -- the serious counterespionage issues surrounding Steele's primary sub-source, Igor Danchenko."

j. "The FBI leadership essentially disregarded the Clinton Plan intelligence, which it received at almost the same time as the Australian Paragraph Five information. This was despite the fact that at precisely the same time as the Clinton Plan intelligence was received (i) the Clinton campaign made public statements tying the DNC computer hack to Russian attempts to help Trump get elected, (ii) the FBI was receiving the Clinton campaign-funded Steele reports, and (iii) the Clinton campaign-funded Alfa Bank allegations were being prepared for delivery to the media and the FBI."

k. "The Crossfire Hurricane investigators essentially ignored information they had received as early as October 2016 regarding Charles Dolan, a longtime Democratic operative with ties to the Clintons who also possessed significant ties to Russian government figures who would appear in Steele's reporting, and never interviewed hm."

l. "The Crossfire Hurricane investigators provided only partial, and in some instances misleading, information to Department attorneys working on the Page FISA applications while withholding other highly relevant information from those attorneys and the FISC that might cast real doubt on their probable cause assertions."

Mr. Durham's Report also stated [1, p. 124]:

"The FBI obtained a total of four FISC orders targeting Page, which authorized intrusive electronic surveillance of Page and physical searches of certain items of his property from October 2016 to September 2017. Each of the FISA applications set forth the FBI's basis for believing that Page was knowingly engaged in clandestine activities on behalf of Russia, or knowingly helping others in such activities and alleged -- based, in part, on the Steele Reports -- that (i) Page was part of a 'well-developed conspiracy of co-operation' between Trump's campaign and the Russian government (Steele Report 2016/095), (ii) Page allegedly met in July 2016 with Igor Sechin, Chairman of Russian energy conglomerate Rosneft, and Igor Divyekin, a senior official in the Russian presidential Administration (Steele report 2016/094), (iii) the Kremlin had for years gathered compromising information on Clinton (Steele Report 2016/080) and (iv) Russia had leaked DNC emails to WikiLeaks, an idea concocted by Page and others (Steele Report 2016/102)" [1, p. 124].

Mr. Durham' Report also stated [1, p. 18]:

"Our investigation also revealed that senior FBI personnel displayed a serious lack of analytical rigor towards the information they received, especially information received from politically affiliated persons and entities."

Mr. Durham's Report cited the *OIG Review of Crossfire Hurricane* [1, p. 303]:

"We did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the FBI's decision to see FISA authority on Carter Page" [3, p. vii]; and
"While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the [FBI personnel], we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or problems we identified" [3, p. xii]

Mr. Durham's Report also noted [1, p. 288]:

"As the more complete record shows, there are specific areas of Crossfire Hurricane activity in which the FBI badly underperformed and failed, not only in its duties to the public, but also in preventing the severe reputational harm that has befallen the FBI as a consequence of Crossfire Hurricane."

Mr. Durham's Report also cited [1. p. 305] the FBI Inspection Division Report [4, p. 33]:

the investigators "repeatedly ignore[d] or explain[ed] away evidence contrary to the theory the Trump campaign ... had conspired with Russia ... It appeared that ... there was a pattern of assuming nefarious intent."

Mr. Durham's Report also noted [1, p. 296]:

"Unlike most FBI investigations, which are managed from FBI field offices, Crossfire Hurricane was managed from FBI Headquarters. The information it collected was not shared with or available to others in the FBI, including ... the Directorate of Intelligence." The information was highly compartmented to the point that even those working on it did not have full access to the data.

6 My Opinion

So Mr. Durham did not find any overt political bias within the FBI, nor outright misconduct, or even incompetence in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation; it was a generic series of accidents and honest but incorrect decisions made at virtually every step. The thing we don't know, and never will know, would those actions have been the same if Steele and Joffe had made the same allegations against Clinton?

Here are some issues that occurred to me in the course of reading Mr. Durham's report. Like his re-counting of the FBI's actions, it seems that Mr. Durham also missed some opportunities.

a. Steele was a confidential source for the FBI. When he provided his first Report on 5 Jul 2016, the FBI was content with Steele's claim that one of his associates was running a network of sources [1, p. 13]. It didn't matter to the FBI. So long as the allegations were derogatory toward Trump, it was good enough. But Mr. Durham did not pursue this any further to try and find out why the FBI was not the least bit curious about Steele's sources.

b. Given the long list of "errors" cited by Durham, taken together, it appears that either: a) the FBI was in on the conspiracy against Trump, or b) welcomed the Steele/Joffe allegations as a way to bury the Clinton email scandal and help her get elected.

c. Regarding Durham's investigation:

- 1) Peter Strzok provided information to the Durham team regarding the false Alfa Bank episode, but refused to cooperate otherwise [1, p. 48];
- 2) Andrew McCabe refused to cooperate with Durham's investigation [1, p. 102];
- 3) Bill Priestap provided information to Durham's team regarding the false Alfa Bank episode, but refused to cooperate otherwise [1, p. 50];
- 4) Fusion GPS employees refused cooperate with Durham's investigation [1, p. 180];
- 5) Christopher Steele refused to cooperate with Durham's investigation [1, p. 233];
- 6) Igor Danchenko refused to cooperate with Durham's investigation [1, p. 233];
- 7) Rodney Joffe refused to cooperate with Durham's investigation [1, p. 261];
- 8) Glenn Simpson refused to cooperate with Durham' investigation [1, p. 275]; and
- 9) The DNC and the Clinton campaign asserted attorney-client privilege over many Fusion GPS emails [1, p. 180].

Since Durham had subpoena power, why didn't he subpoena all of these, place them under oath, and force them to tell the truth, commit perjury, or assert their Fifth Amendment rights? Answer: professional courtesy. Durham doesn't want to know too much as it may reflect badly on Democratic Party operatives, inside and outside the FBI; and secondly, since we are dealing here with Democratic Party operatives, it is very important that the statute of limitations be allowed to expire. Which is to say: the Durham investigation is the usual Cesspool, D. C. whitewash.

d. With this level of incompetence and/or willing ignorance, why do we need the FBI? We should hire the ghost of Barney Fife to lead the ghosts of the Keystone Kops.

In the latter pages of his Report [1, pp. 295-302], Mr. Durham mentions several "reforms" initiated at the FBI, presumably by Director Christopher Wray. Apparently they haven't worked, since the FBI is known since then to have assisted the Biden campaign in covering up the Biden Syndicate laptop left at

the computer repair shop just prior to the 2020 election, and also apparently has not made any attempt to investigate any of the evidence collected from that laptop.

Mr. Durham called out "confirmation bias" [1, p. 305] as a rationale for many of the FBI's actions. What goes around comes around, and the FBI should not be surprised that the public has developed "confirmation bias" about the FBI. Here are three examples:

"Every statement made by any FBI employee is categorically false unless they prove otherwise in a court of law, under oath, beyond a reasonable doubt, with full and complete unredacted documentation."

"The FBI is a wholly owned and operated subsidiary of the Democratic Party; covering for Democrats and fabricating evidence against Republicans."

"All non-Democrat political campaigns, their officials, and family members are under full-time physical and electronic surveillance by the FBI."

I hope we don't hear any whimpering from the FBI about these "confirmation biases" held by the public. The FBI worked hard for it, they earned it, they deserve it, and hopefully the public will not deprive them of it.

References

- [1] John H. Durham, *Report on Matters Related to the Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising out of the 2016 Presidential Campaigns*, Washington DC, Office of Special Counsel, 12 May 2023
- [2] Robert S. Mueller III, *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election*, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington DC, Mar 2019
- [3] Office of Inspector General, U. S. Department of Justice, *Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation*, 8 Dec 2019
- [4] FBI Inspection Division, Internal Affairs Section, *Closing Electronic Communication for Case # [redacted]*, 15 Nov 2021